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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to reconcile Western and Afiican philosophy with specific reference to the 
issues of rationality, culture and communitarianism. It also discusses the post-Enlightenment, 
Western philosophical concept ofliberal "atomism" and the primacy of the individual and the 
emergence of a communitarian critique in response. This thesis intends exploring how Western 
-
notions of individuality and the communitarian response can be reconciled with contemporary 
African philosophy and African communitarian thought in particular. To do this, it is necessary 
to explore the problem ofliberal individualism and how Afiican communitarianism might 
reinforce the Western communitarian critique. Afiican communitarianism has a processual 
understanding of personhood that underpins its conception of the Self. In contrast to this view, 
Western communitarianism has a relational conception of the individual Self. Thus, this thesis 
argues that Afiican communitarianism has a more profound understanding of the constitution 
of the Self. To demonstrate these claims, this study discusses notions of rationality which 
inform each ofthe philosophical traditions. This will enable a comparative analysis ofthe 
above-mentioned philosophical traditions with the intention of uncovering the concepts that 
provide the platform for their reconciliation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis discusses modem liberalism, communitarianism and African philosophy examining 
notions of individuality, community and rationality within these philosophical traditions. It 
studies these three perspectives, identifYing similarities and differences that emerge. The first 
task is to discuss the post-Enlightenment, Western philosophical concepts based on liberal 
atomism and the primacy of the individual and contrasting it with the debates coming out of 
the communitarian critique ofliberalism . Furthermore, this research will investigate how 
African philosophy in its understanding of personhood and community can further the 
communitarian critique ofliberalism. 
In contemporary South Africa, there is a need to undertake research to give meaning and 
content to the vision of the African Renaissance. With regard to this, Gyekye (in Coetzee, 
2000b: 14) argues that "the evolution of the socio-political theory which integrates the values 
of individuality and community is a necessary pre-condition of Africa's renaissance". This 
necessitates the project that is pursued in this thesis and which aims at reconciling different 
philosophical perspectives: aspects of liberal individualism, communitarianism and African 
philosophy. 
The first part of this thesis discusses liberal individualism, its origins and problematic in 
Western philosophy. The aim of this endeavour is to understand the concept of individuality 
and the notion of rationality that informs it. The main problem raised with this view is that of 
prioritising the individual over the community, thereby assuming that individuals pre-exist 
community. 
This is a significant problem in individualism because all other questions emerge out of this 
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presupposition. 
The criticism of this is that individuals, in making their life choices, must be informed by the 
values of the community within which they were reared. 
Furthermore, to be able to make moral choices, individuals must have some advanced 
understanding of moral concepts and values which they only acquire within the community. It 
is at this point that communitarianism raises problems with liberal individualism. Liberal 
individualism is informed by Kantian rationality which emphasises individual autonomy and 
self-determination as constituting rational agency (Taylor, 1985). It is here that the liberal 
theory of rights emanate. 
Communitarianism and Afiican philosophy seek to provide the discussion with the necessary 
conditions for individual development which are absent in liberal individualism. This 
constitutes the second and third tasks of this thesis. African philosophers and communitarians 
discuss rights which emanate from their respective conceptions of a person. They suggest that 
one does not need to make atomistic assumptions to have a theory ofrights. 
F or the communitarian, human beings are social animals. Individuals are embedded within the 
community which then shapes them and affect the choices of their life plans. Afiican 
philosophers go further than this. Concurring that individuals are social animals, they provide a 
concept of personhood which captures their understanding of the nature of the person and the 
conditions in which they are constituted within their communities and cultures. Some Afiican 
philosophers talk about the actual cultural practices which have an impact in life and destiny of 
the child growing within the culture particularly in the Afiican context. 
This is informed by a notion of rationality that differs from Kantian rationality. 
The notion of rationality found in African philosophy and communitarianism is contextual 
rationality due to the emphasis on the community and culture in which each person embedded. 
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This notion of rationality deviates from the Western notion of rationality which assumes 
universality which, in most cases, tends to excludes African philosophy. 
The challenge posed against universality in the Western notion of rationality raises another 
problem for us. This is the problem of particularity which results in relativism. This is pursued 
in the third task of this thesis. In pursuing the above-mentioned discussions, there is a need to 
clarify African philosophy and because it has come to have different meanings in the post-
colonial discourse. Firstly, it is essential to establish the necessity of talking about an African 
philosophy. 
Serequeberhan (1993: 38) asserts that all cultures deal with the same philosophical issues 
which are universal. It is important to note than even though they are universal, they differ in 
how each culture traces the unity of these "themes, synthesises and organises them based on 
the conception pflife, namely the interrelation between objects and persons and between 
persons themselves" . Therefore, he (ibid) argues, we can and should be able to talk about 
African philosophy because African culture has its own way of establishing order, its own view 
of life. The stream of African philosophy spoken about in this thesis is modern contemporary 
African philosophy. 
Contemporary African philosophy understands philosophy as systematised writings of African 
professional philosophers who examine traditional thought and culture and from these extract 
issues relevant for philosophy. This does not refer to traditional assertions that lack analytical 
dimension and argumentative justification because without these, Wiredu (1998: 196) argues, 
there is no philosophy. 
It is vital to make a distinction between this view of African philosophy from African 
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socialism. Afiican socialism was drawn from Marxism and because of the similarity of the 
Afiican communal structure with the vision of Marxism, it was possible to import socialism as 
the answer in restoring the pre-colonial Afiican community. This view did not take into 
account the meanings and the symbols that made society cohere in the African context and the 
understanding of personhood, which made community important. 
The fourth task of this thesis is to provide the critical evaluation of communitarianism and 
Afiican philosophy and then investigate the possibility of reconciling the three philosophical 
perspectives discussed in the thesis. In pursuing this task, reference is made to Hegelian 
philosophy, the distant ancestor of communitarianism as the basis upon which a synthesis 
might be possible excepting some aspects in the understanding of rationality. 
The possible problem with this is, as it has been implied by Olufemi Taiwo (1998:8) in his 
article: Exorcising Hegel's Ghost: Africa's challenge 10 philosophy, it is difficult how imagine 
how Afiican philosophy can be commensurable with Hegelian philosophy. Hegel argued that 
"Afiica proper, as far as history goes back, has remained for all 
purposes of connection with the rest of the World shut up; it is 
gold-land compressed within itself the land of childhood, which 
lying beyond the day of history, is enveloped in the dark mantle 
of night" (Taiwo,1998: 6) 
In this passage Hegel refers to Africa proper which he describes as Afiica south of Sahara. The 
motivation for this outrageous claim is clear when Hegel argued (in Taiwo, ibid) that "the 
peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to 
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it, we must give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas - the category of 
universality". Hegel's main point of contention is the absence of the category of universality 
which African thought represented in his time, more especially the work done by explorer-
anthropologists . 
This refers to ethno-philosophy which has since been rejected by many a modem African 
philosopher for the very reason that Hegel invokes in the above passage. This is folk thought 
that lacks the critical analytical dimension and argumentative justification Wiredu (1998: 196) 
refers to . Therefore, we can talk of African philosophy being reconciled at certain levels with 
Hegelianism, because modem African philosophy is an attempt to escape the problems of 
ethno-philosophy, which was based on cosmological and spiritistic argument, and do 
philosophy according to certain universal standards, nevertheless, maintaining the uniqueness 
of African philosophy. In the fourth task the goal is to attempt to reconcile different 
philosophical perspectives and identifY the platform upon reconciliation can be achieved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LmERAL INDIVIDUALISM 
The subject's right to be satisfied, or in other words the right of subjective 
freedom, is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and 
modern times. This right in its infinity is given expression in Christianity 
and it has become the universal effective principle of a new form of 
civilization. 
Hegel 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses individualism and its problems in the liberal tradition. The focus will be 
on liberal contract theories that emerged in the seventeenth century as well as successor 
doctrines that view society as constituted by individuals in pursuit of their own ends (Taylor, 
1992: 29). Essentially in this tradition, individuals pre-exist community and combine to form 
community. The liberal tradition prioritises the individual above the principle of obligation that 
flows from individuals belonging to society (ibid, p.30). The first task of this chapter is to lay 
out the tenets ofliberalism as a political theory. In this, it is important to distinguish between 
seventeenth century classical liberalism and post-Enlightenment liberalism. This will enable us 
to examine post-Enlightenment modem liberalism which is crucial for this thesis. In doing this 
the distinction between negative and positive liberty will be important. 
Having done so, it will be necessary to pursue the discussion of individualism that will that will 
inform an understanding ofliberal neutrality that is linked to both individualism and rationality. 
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This will be achieved through the discussion of Kant's theory of freedom (Taylor, 1985) and 
the notions of rationality that inform modern liberal thought. Rationality as reflective and 
deliberative articulated in Kant (ibid) and rationality as instrumental are both important in 
liberalism. Crowley (1987) develops these ideas by exposing the lack of character and depth in 
the liberal conception of the human agent. This last theme leads into an important issue - the 
communitarian response to modern liberalism. 
MODERN AND CLASSICAL LmERALISM 
The distinction between classical and modern liberalism is essential for the understanding of 
continuity and discontinuity in the liberal tradition. This will highlight the foundations of liberal 
thinking characterised by MacPherson (1962) as "possessive individualism". Very important as 
the basis of classical liberalism is the doctrine of social contract propounding an instrumental 
view of society and certain forms of utilitarianism emanating from this doctrine (Taylor, 1992: 
29). In this tradition ofliberal thought, Thomas Hobbes became the most famous thinker. In 
this theory liberty is prior to legitimate order, legitimate order arises only as the creation of 
individuals through consent that entails the conferring of their natural rights to ruler (Taylor, 
1985: 319). Freedom, in this sense, is part of the natural condition of people called the 'state 
of nature' (ibid); political society then becomes a human attempt for the protection of the 
individual's property in his person (MacPherson, 1962: 264). 
This view, Taylor (1985:319) argues, sees liberty outside a social context, it belongs to man by 
virtue of being naturally alive. Liberty, understood naturalistically, exists in such conditions as 
that state of nature that results in the state of war because of the appetitiveness and 
possessiveness of the individual unbridled in the absence oflegal prohibitions from an 
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authoritative structure (Taylor, ibid; MacPherson, 1962: 25). 
In this context society can be understood as instrumental in order to protect the liberty of the 
individual from intrusions of other individuals in their appetitive pursuits in society (Berlin, 
1958: 11). 
This is the case with Locke as well (MacPherson, 1962: 269). Individuals are by nature equally 
free from the jurisdiction of others. The freedom of each individual is only limited by the 
requirement of other's freedoms. This necessitates some monitoring. Therefore, political 
society becomes a 'contractual device' for the protection of the individual and the orderly 
regulation of their relations with each other (MacPherson, 1962: 269) This captures the central 
features of what is called classical liberalism. This political theory forms the basis ofliberal 
thinking and the major part of what came to be called negative liberty as we shall see later on. 
Modern liberalism understands itself as an alternative political theory to the' overly 
individualistic theory in classical liberalism (Gaus, 1982:7). Classical liberalism viewed people 
as independent, private and competitive beings who see civil association as a framework for 
the pursuit of individual interests (ibid.) . These views, though understood as only the tenets of 
classical liberalism, arguably form the background of liberal thinking. For Gaus (1982) modern 
liberalism and its conception of people stresses mutual dependence over independence, co-
operation over competition and mutual appreciation over private enjoyment. There is a subtle 
theme coming out of this. It is important to note that this theory, though it waters down 
classical liberal conceptions, still prioritises the individual over the community in that the 
individual enters community for mutual pursuit and protection of his own life plans and 
aspirations. Crittenden (1992: 155) expands on this subtle shift in modern liberalism. He 
argues that the modern liberal enterprise is to reconcile individuality and sociality. 
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This view asserts that individuals must look to others in the community in order to fully 
complete themselves. The understanding here is that for an individual to develop fully his 
nature, he must work with others in society. Citing Gaus, he (ibid) argues that the idea of 
finding completion in others is the crucial conceptual link between the modem liberal's 
conception of individuality and their avowal of man's social interests. This, it is argued, may 
take modem liberal thought out of the atomistic orientations that are associated with the 
classical tradition (ibid). One should bear in mind that the completion of an individual that is 
said to happen in community is an individual's ability to pursue his own unadulterated interests 
and life plans protected from inhibitions by others by the authoritative society structure. 
Crittenden (ibid.) suggests that it might be argued that this debate does not actually take 
modem liberals out of the atomistic orientation completely because, in essence, social 
relationships remain quite instrumental. Liberals argue that these relationships do not amount 
to instrumentalism because individuals in society have intrinsic interest in the lives of others 
and share experiences with them (ibid). Therefore, according to modem liberals, the pursuit of 
individual life plans does not mean that individuals are atomistic because they would have 
intrinsic interest in the lives of others which would have implications for the nature of their life 
plans. 
This is still problematic because these individuals are able to see and determine the social 
relationships they pursue - it seems as if they are the ones who decide their involvement in 
pursuit of completion of self Essentially, this does not fall far from individualism. It might be 
argued that this individual is still possessive, if not very atomistic. 
As Crittenden puts it (ibid) there seems to be a fear of losing the individual in the affirming of 
the importance of the community. Modem liberals having attempted to reconcile individuality 
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and sociality still leave some gaps. 
Rawls (1972), in his theory of justice attempts to do this. The Rawlsian subject in the original 
position is not alone but with other subjects who are also under the veil of ignorance. This 
means that this subject is in a social relationship. They are together to decide the terms of a 
just society. Perhaps, this is an example of how modern liberals attempt to reconcile 
individuality and sociality. Rawls (in Crittenden, p.155) argues that everybody needs one 
another as partners in ways oflife that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes 
and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to one's own good. The 
individual in this sense is abstract. The social relationship in which he is a player does not 
constitute his self In a sense, he still remains an individuated self among other selves. His 
involvement in this community is for the reason of setting the fair standards for him to play and 
pursue his life plans. The question of instrumentality of this social relationship under the veil of 
ignorance comes out strongly in Rawls' language cited above. Rawls misrepresents the way in 
which people relate to their conceptions of good (Mulhall & Swift, 1992: 13, 14). 
His view mistakenly assumes that people's ends are formed independent of or prior society, 
which is regarded (as in classical liberalism) as the outcome of negotiation between individuals 
whose ends are already given prior that social relationship (ibid). 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LIBERTY 
In order to further clarifY the differences between classical and modern liberalism as well as 
conceptualise the contemporary meaning of liberalism, it is crucial to embark on the 
differentiation between negative and positive liberty pioneered by Berlin (1958). For Berlin, 
the conception ofliberty that asserts that one is free to the degree to which there is no 
interference to the exercising of liberty is the negative conception. If an individual is prevented 
from doing what he himself considers right to do by others he is to a certain degree unfree 
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(ibid, p.7). One's incapacity to attain his goals is lack of freedom. It is regarded as a problem if 
one is prevented from attaining such goals by human interference (ibid). Moving from the 
naturalistic notion of freedom which understands freedom as the natural condition mankind, it 
is supposed that if men were left to their own devices, this would be a state where men 
interfere with the private sphere of others, it is therefore assumed that the area of men's free 
action needs to be protected by law. It is argued that there must be a private sphere (of men 
free pursuits of his goals) which should under no circumstances be overstepped because that 
would entail an interference of individual freedom (ibid, p.09). 
The idea of negative liberty, in essence, posits that one is free to pursue whatever he sees fit 
and only guard that he does not in that pursuit trample on another's area of free action. 
Berlin (ibid) clearly states that in saying that the negative defence ofliberty consists in the goal 
of warding off interference. Therefore, threatening a man with persecution or any or 
imprisonment until he submits to the life which he exercises no choices of his goals is the 
repudiation of his freedom . To deny a man all opportunities but one, no matter how admirable 
the prospects upon which it opens or morally desirable its results is to "sin against the truth 
that he is a man with a life of his own to live" (ibid). This means that no matter how pure the 
motive of these actions may, they amount to the violation of freedom. 
Non-interference and absence of restraint in all human pursuits represent a natural life of man. 
This conception of liberty may be fitted with the classical liberals already discussed above. The 
defence ofliberty is valued regardless of the reason to block it, it does not matter if that 
defence ofliberty will eventually lead to fragmentation of society. The problem here is that 
though there is a provision that prevents an individual from trampling on another's freedom in 
11 
pursuit of his own, the pulling of each individual to his own self-determined goal may lead to 
eventual societal fragmentation. 
The content of communitarian critique, as will be discussed in more detail later, goes along 
these lines. Negative liberty may be summarised as 'freedom from' but on the contrary positive 
freedom as 'freedom to' (ibid, p.16). 
F or Berlin, this positive sense of freedom is about the individual being the originator of his 
own life plans and decisions. For this conception, freedom is realised when one is moved by 
reason, or purposes which are his very own (ibid.) An individual must be self-directed, 
deciding and not just acted upon by external nature or by other men. It asserts that it is 
rationality, reason that distinguishes one from the world. The free individual in the positive 
sense of freedom should be conscious of himself as a "thinking, willing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for his choices and able to explain by reference to his own ideas and purposes" 
(ibid). 
This is important, because it sets the tone for the kind of an individual posited in modern 
liberalism and modern society in generaL The above assertions are about individuals who do 
not act on a stimuli-response basis but those who reflect on things. This is somewhat different 
from the negative sense of freedom, which emphasises the absence of restraints on individual 
goals. The positive sense of freedom, though concerned about the absence of external 
restraint, are essentially concerned with the quality of the pursuits which must be self-
originated, not felt but reasoned. This conception of freedom offers an understanding of 
freedom as self-determination (Taylor, 1985: 321). The negative conception ofliberty can 
obviously be associated with classical notions of freedom as the natural condition of man that 
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prevailed in the pursuing and fulfilment of unhindered desires. This conception could be 
understood, as a form of slavery in light of the modem notions embodied in positive liberty. 
Self-detennination entails the individual's recovering ofthe authentic self, ' the voice within' 
(ibid). 
The assertions about the authentic self are crucial here because they cannot escape the 
arguments about the constitution of that self 
Berlin, in positing this authentic self, presents it as the dominant self This implies a self that 
stands dominant to the power of his natural desires. This self is the one that is identified with 
reason (ibid, p.17). He argues that: 
This dominant self - variously identified with reason, with my 'higher nature', 
with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfY it in the long run, with 
my 'real' or 'ideal', or 'autonomous' self or with my self at its best (ibid). 
The dominant self, he posits, is contrasted with the' empirical' self with irrational impulses 
controlled by uncontrolled desires and passions. This is the self that is tossed back and forth by 
every gust of feeling, desire and passion (ibid). 
This self can be referred to as the 'felt self. This conception of liberty may be problematic 
because it allows individuals to pursue what they consider their own conceptions of good and 
that may degrade cohesion in the society. For instance in the present traditional rural 
organisation there is protocol according to tradition and age in manhood or womanhood and 
this maintains order and cohesion in their community, degradation of that with individual 
pursuit of what one considers to be original to himself may in the long run undennine the 
social order and the order of community leading to fragmentation referred to above. 
This is a sufficient discussion of positive liberty and implications for modem liberalism. In the 
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light of this, it would be fruitful to discuss the concept of individuality which is the direct 
outgrowth of modern liberalism. 
Essentially, this tradition seeks to propound the idea that individuals pre-exist community and 
combine to form community. This is clear in that modern liberalism prioritises the individual 
above the principle of obligation as individuals belonging to society (Taylor, 1992: 30). From 
the above presupposition, liberal thought assumes that society is not the main determinant of 
ends but the outcome of negotiation between individuals whose ends are already given prior 
community (Mulhall & Swift, 1992: 14). This is clear in that individuals in pursuit of their 
interests co-operate for the preservation of themselves as individuals. These ideas are pivotal 
to this chapter as it discusses how liberalism has evolved in response to criticism. 
From this, it is important to introduce the doctrines ofliberal neutrality. Liberal neutrality 
advances the view that individuals in society should pursue their own view of the good life 
(like the one posited in the positive sense of liberty) with assumption of shared values. They 
promote a society with open-ended plurality of values which individuals choose as they think 
and reflect on them (Goodin and Reeve, 1989: 04). This view results in the idea of the society 
or minimal state that does not seek to entrench value-laden decisions but only to facilitate the 
pursuits of individually-determined life plans. This view is rooted in the Kantian notion of 
freedom (Taylor, 1985) that is discussed later in this chapter. 
LmERAL INDIVIDUALISM 
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Individualism is central to classical and modem liberalism. Here the human individual in 
society is defined as valuable in and of itself For Brown (1993:11), the individual is capable of 
exercising freewill and that capacity to make choices is central in defining what it is to be 
human or, should we not say, to be an individual. Brown (ibid) is an important writer who 
explicates the characteristics of the modem liberal individual. In liberal individualism the notion 
of choice and the capacity of an individual are crucial for this project because capacity in a 
human individual is developmental. Thus, the invocation of capacity in individualism requires a 
discussions of capacity-formation. Is the capacity to make choices divorced from the social 
and historical context? That question entails origins and then the scope of such choices. This is 
going to come out clearly in our discussion. 
Central to liberal individualism, according to McKercher (Brown, 1993: 11), is an affirmation 
of individual autonomy that is exemplified in the significance offree choice discussed above. 
Individualism entails an internally motivated and authentically free will, individuals are active 
subjects who give meaning and sense to the world around them. In this view, it is argued that 
what matters is an individual giving shape and content to form and content of community and 
not vice-versa. (ibid, p.12). In arguing this, Brown (ibid) is basically assuming that the 
community does not have a life and consciousness of its own (repudiation of the organic 
community). This view then understands community only as the collection of individuals and 
the aggregation of their wills. 
This is problematic and has grave implications for liberal political theory. It undermines the 
community (its life and consciousness) that is crucial in constituting the self, giving content to 
the self and his capacity for choice and action (ibid). 
Brown (ibid, p.14) presents two ways in which liberalism is seen and these views are not 
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necessarily mutually exclusive. Liberal individualism is seen as abstract. This means that it has 
been seen as divorced from social or historical context; as individuals pre-exist community. 
This kind of understanding of the individual can be associated with the social contract theories 
of classical liberalism (ibid) . The second way in which liberal individualism has been 
comprehended is MacPhersonian possessiveness (1962). This means that the issue here is not 
only free will but also ownership of property, property in his own person (ibid, p. 1 5). This is 
important for understanding rationality discussed later in this chapter. 
Brown herself describes that concept of possessiveness as an accurate characterisation of 
liberal individualism (ibid). MacPherson's concept of possessiveness is clearly stated in his 
propositions on possessive individualism which he argues are characteristics ofliberalism, 
classical or modern. 
MacPherson (ibid, p. 263) argues that: 
the individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for 
which he owes nothing to society. 
This idea of possessiveness is rooted in the positive conceptions ofliberty. The idea of a 
rational will central to this conception of freedom is an important fact for establishing 
possessiveness. Van Niekerk (1998:63) defines acting rationally as the acting of the subject to 
gain complete autonomy or self-possession. Therefore, the individual in pursuing self-
determined goals gains autonomy and self-possession. The rational individual posited by Berlin 
(1958) and Kant (Taylor, 1985) is possessive in that, he is self-determining, and if he, as an 
individual, still carries out his vegetative human desires unhindered, he could still be 
considered irrationaL 
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The individual in modern liberalism is possessive and it is from this that a problem starts, the 
possessiveness of the self in the context of community is the basis of individual atomism. If the 
self is possessive in the sense discussed above, he then becomes atomistic in pursuit of his life 
plans, those that are particular to him and only relate to others because of the provision against 
violation of their freedom in pursuit of individual life plans. 
Taylor (1992: 29) also characterises the individual posited in modern liberalism as atomistic. 
This tradition originated in the seventeenth century doctrines and has resurfaced in the 
contemporary liberalism. Central in this doctrine is what can be called the primacy of right. 
This primacy of right theory running through liberal individualism ascribes certain rights to 
individuals as fundamental and binding unconditionally. 
It also views the obligation to belong or sustain a society as laid on individuals only through 
their own consent or through belonging to that society being only to his advantage (ibid, p.3O). 
This means that the responsibility for individuals to maintain societal life is only acceptable if 
they, as individuals, consented to it. The idea of belonging to a community continues in 
liberalism to be viewed in instrumental terms. An individual as a free willing being consents to 
a community and may join it through it being important for his pursuits or self-completion as 
discussed in the beginning. 
The primacy of right doctrine can be contrasted with the fact that human beings, as argued by 
Aristotle, are social animals because they cannot be self-sufficient alone, which atomism 
assumes prior society (ibid, p.32) This is problematic for modern liberalism and this is the front 
at which the debate with communitarians take place. The primacy of right theory asserts the 
right of freedom attributed to humans to be able to choose their own life plans, to form their 
convictions and within the bounds of reason to act on them (ibid, p.40). 
The capacity of an individual to make choices about his life plans, to form convictions based 
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on the particular conceptions of good is not there just by virtue of being alive. This is the 
problem with liberalism. Taylor (ibid) argues that these capacities may fail in some cases to be 
developed. If these capacities may not be properly developed, that means there are certain 
conditions that must be in place for proper development of such capacities. Embeddedness in 
community life is the necessary condition for development of such capacities, their 
development is not a question of choice prior to community but develops within a community. 
Individualism and the primacy of right doctrine are central in constituting the tradition. Even 
though some points in liberal thought have recently been watered down in response to 
communitarian critique. There are crucial issues that remain central in liberal thought; many of 
which are have been highlighted. Having said that, it would be important to investigate the 
foundations ofliberalism in order to remain clear as to what issues still warrant criticism while 
saying more about the possessive nature ofthe liberal individuaL The following section 
discusses the Kantian Foundations of modem liberalism and its criticism. 
KANTIAN FOUNDATIONS 
Kantian rationality is imperative to understand the basis ofliberal thought. For Kant (Taylor, 
1985: 321) contrasting Hume's idea that reason must be a slave to passions, it is reason that 
must occupy the highest place in determining action rather than passions. The former view 
sees reason as instrumental and this renders reason oflittle value (ibid). The real function of 
reason is to give our actions quality motivation The role of reason is to have an influence on 
the will (ibid) . Therefore rationality for Kant makes actions moral. Kantian rationality 
postulates that it is not really an outcome by itself that decides the morality of an action (i. e. 
whether an action is good). This is because one may pursue outcomes out of duty or a 
'pathologically submissive self. The morality of an action must be decided by the quality of 
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the motivation that inspires it, which must be reason (ibid, p.322). 
This is important because from the very onset, duty, as a motivating factor of human action, is 
inferiorised or disqualified. The sources of duty are numerous. It can be imagined that duty can 
be connected to the context within which an individual finds himself in. Therefore, if one acts 
out of duty, one has allowed external factors to intrude upon his autonomy (ibid). 
This has implications for an individual embedded in community. For Kant what qualifies as 
quality motivation for an action is something internal to the individual, that which he is the 
only determinant of An individual acts morally when he acts with a certain goal, this is the 
goal of confonning the will to reason (ibid, p. 322). Because rational creatures act on the basis 
of reason not out of duty, they conform to laws that they have formulated. In this wayan 
individual in acting according to the law he has reasoned or detennined is free indeed as the 
rational agent (ibid, p.323). What does this say for the laws or values that pre-existed an 
individual? If these individuals are guided by anything but their rationality, there will be 
problems for any social structure that assumes the role of guiding an individual self This is 
because the structures of social institutions and their laws which pre-exist the living rational 
agents could then be neglected. In response to these probing thoughts, Kant argues that 
rational agents recognize the common law. This makes it constitutive of moral agency (ibid, p. 
328). In this assertion it is very important to understand what he means about recognition. 
This means that individuals have to have consented actively to the common law that binds 
them in society. This idea is linked to the conception of freedom as self-detennination by an 
individual will. This is called 'autonomy' (Taylor, 1979: 04). 
If an individual deviates from this he is then acting in a manner which is unworthy of a rational 
agent, he is living a life lesser than the standard of freedom. If an individual allows the will to 
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be determined by an external consideration, natural inclination, any authority is failing his 
rational agency, his call to freedom (ibid). The fact that these rational agency stand and 
' recognise' the common law through which to govern their lives sounds more like the 
seventeenth century social contract where individual mutually confer their (natural) rights to 
the authority they all recognise. But the difference is with the Kantian rational agents these 
common laws do not have the determining function but the facilitating function amongst the 
pursuits of rational wills. 
This understanding of rationality (as pure reason) is objectionable. An individual in the Kantian 
understanding of rationality has the ability to evaluate between courses of action and therefore 
has an ability to offer an account of why he chose and acted the way he did (Crowley, 1987: 
177). This is not exactly the problem, because it is necessary for an individual to have the 
freedom to choose between courses of action and to be able reflect on these an offer an 
account. If an individual is not able to reflect and offer an account of his action, he has a 
problem either in his mental capacities or there is a severe case of totalitarian conditioning. It is 
in the individual's mental capacities to understand and to reflect upon what he is doing. 
If to be responsible for judgements and therefore courses of action one chooses, then that is to 
be responsible for who one is (ibid.) . In that sense then "it is ' up to us' who we are, the 
implication being that we have some capacity to shape ourselves and hence our evaluations" 
(ibid.) The problem with this is the fact some judgements or choice of actions will inevitably 
lead the individual to evaluate about what is the moral action to take. 
The question of the morality of a particular act cannot be determined by an individual nor by 
the time he needs to make the choice, it naturally precedes him. This is a problem 
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for Kantian rationality because for him a rational individual lives under the regime of morality 
that he has partly formulated (Taylor, 1985: 323). 
Taking this further, pure reason, by its nature, cannot be a faculty that unilaterally enables 
people to choose who they are in any radical sense. This is not a faculty that is given prima-
facie (Crowley, 1987: 212). This is because there will be nothing to reason about and the 
courses of action facing an individual who is denied any "morally significant context" will be 
meaningless until an individual has some purpose he is pursuing which he can only have in the 
context of some serious interpersonal relationship (ibid: 208). To make choices an individual 
needs to have concept, an idea about what life is and then his destiny in it. Kwasi Wiredu, in 
his book Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African perspective (1996: 19), argues that 
a human being is born only with a biological make-up, but with no concepts and within that 
make-up lies the basis of innate conceptual abilities. 
In order for one to have and understand a specific concept (especially with reference choice 
and its moral substance), one must have some linguistic ability and such an ability with others 
that are not mentioned is the result of training through the learning process. This serves to 
make clear the fact that "reason functions as a means to understand and bring to consciousness 
that dimension of depth - inarticulate sense of self which necessarily precedes our ability to 
reason" (Crowley, 1987: 213). Therefore, it is problematic to conceive of reason which, in a 
way, enables an individual to choose himself 
This is a very strong challenge towards Kantian rationality and should require Kantian liberals 
to seriously revisit the intellectual foundations of liberal thinking if they are to talk of a social 
individual, because the liberal self that flows from Kantian rationality and the social-political 
arrangement flowing from it cannot be reconciled a self constituted in a community. 
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Modem liberalism, because of these problems, has been serious challenged by the 
philosophical tradition called communitarianism which offers a critique of the liberal self 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF LmERALISM 
Imitation is natural to man from childhood; he differs from other animals 
in that he is the most imitative; the first things he learns come to him 
through imitation. 
Aristotle 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the communitarian criticism ofthe normative priority 
of the individual in the modern liberal tradition. This view prioritises the community over the 
individual and views the community as a primary necessity for developing the capacity for 
choice which is necessary for individual freedom. Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter 
is to present an exposition of communitarianism. The first part of this chapter will focus on 
discussing the Hegelian foundations of communitarianism. This is crucial for a discussion of a 
notion of rationality different from the one propounded by Kant. The second part of the 
chapter will then present a general exposition of communitarianism together with liberal 
modifications. 
In discussing post-Enlightenment liberalism, two important themes emerge. Mouffe 
(1990:218) identifies these as "self-assertion" and "self-foundation". The former can be 
identified with the political project ofliberalism and the latter with the epistemological project . 
The first theme is about the individual in liberalism who makes his own choices. This idea in 
simple terms can be associated with the primacy- of- rights aspects in liberalism (Taylor, 1992: 
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30). The second aspect highlights the abstractness of the individual who seems to be the 
originator of his own individuality. This is expressed in Kantian rationality. The communitarian 
critique is set against both these aspects of the Enlightenment liberal project. In discussing 
Hegel's concept of "ethical life", the purpose is to address the second aspect ofthe 
Enlightenment project (,self-foundation") and discrepancies thereof 
HEGELIAN FOUNDATIONS 
Hegelian "ethical life'" has been very important for establishing a communitarian notion of 
rationality. Therefore, it would be very important to discuss it as a foundation for 
communitarianism. Ethical life refers to mutual moral obligations one has to an ongoing 
community of which one is an important part and this set of obligations have to further and 
sustain this society (Taylor, 1984: 177). Our main interest in ethical life is how exactly does 
being part of this ongoing community constitute the self The idea of "ethical life" can be 
contrasted with Kantian morality. 
With Kantian morality, obligation holds an individual not in virtue of being part of a 
community, but as an individual who in anything is self-initiating and is in that sense a rational 
will (ibid, p.178). But Hegelian ethical life holds that morality reaches its fullness in an 
ongoing community. This is what gives obligation its definitive content as well as providing 
the context for realizing it (ibid.). Morality in this sense is not abstract but has a foundation in 
community. Ethical life emphasizes the significance of the process of becoming an individual. 
'Ethical life refers to a social order, that is composed of a set of institutions which are 
the family, the civil society and the modem state (Wood, 1990: 196). 
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The Hegelian response to the abstractness of Kant ian morality is that moral duty has to have a 
history and cannot be conceived of as something separate from the social and political 
circumstances (Smith, 1989: 71). 
Therefore, this conception of morality calls Kantian morality based on willing and acting 
rationally to question. The main issues as raised by McIntyre (ibid) is that 
moral concepts are embodied and are partially constitutive of forms 
of social life. To understand a moral concept, to grasp the meaning 
of the words which express it, is always at least to learn what the rules 
are which govern use of such words and so to grasp the role ofthe 
concept in language and social life. 
This shows that the Kantian rational agent who is prior to and independent of 
community cannot in that sense be moral. This is because if the individual is in any sense 
social, he cannot avoid the good and the right which govern that society within which he is 
situated. Therefore, morality can never result from an individual reflection on which is the 
moral way to live, but rooted in "pre-reflective customs" of a people (ibid, p.72). It is rooted 
in what the individual has no role in determining. 
According to Hegel, moral life is 'situated' within common communal norms and that 
is the only way in which we can decipher the (moral) right or wrong (ibid.). As a result, 
Kantian rationality cannot produce an individual who is social and not abstract but produces 
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an "unencumbered self' found in the recent practical philosophy of John Rawls2 
The unencumbered self is denied the possibility of membership in any community that is bound 
by moral ties antecedent to choice (Sandel, 1992: 19). This is why it is impossible to accept 
the liberal individual based on Kantian rationality and simultaneously any serious framework of 
constitutive community. 
It is important to note that Hegel did not understand the state and the political 
community as only the precondition for freedom but also as the dimension of freedom. This 
means that he did not understand these as requirements and structures for facilitating freedom. 
Freedom is embodied in the state and political community. 
A state ( community) is not just necessary to enforce the fulfilment of contracts and an entity 
with access and license to the use of coercion but a locus of shared understandings (Smith, 
1989: 233). 
The community in this sense is more than just the collection of a number of interests 
which the state must secure in order to maintain individual freedom, it is a network, a union 
of shared ethical ideas and beliefs which develop on a common cultural history and the sense 
2The individual under the "veil of ignorance" does not know how the various 
alternatives present in society will affect his own particular case and they are obliged to 
evaluate and make choices on the basis of general considerations. No one knows his place, 
status and his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and responsibilities. They do not 
have any conception of good but they must choose principles to live by whatever the specifics 
of their individual lives when they get out of the "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1972: 137). 
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of civic identity (ibid.). Hegel's view of rationality and morality is developed by Crowley 
(1987: 208). This is the form of rationality which fits with the communitarian vision of society. 
Crowley (ibid.) argues that the abstract nature of the rationalist epistemology posited by 
liberals is their fatal flaw. He argues that: 
a self without attributes and constitutive attachments cannot 
choose in any morally significant sense of that term (choice), 
what its attributes ought to be, any more than a mind bereft 
of knowledge can reason about what the world or the person 
ought to be like. 
This is what Hegel attempts to express in mentioning common cultural history, the sense of 
civic identity and the ethical beliefs which come to be shared in community. These are 
important ingredients for the development of a rational self in the Hegelian sense. Hegel's 
account of rationality is not a simply given attribute of human behaviour but a goal to be 
achieved (Smith, 1989: 234). 
This is what he means when he refers to community not being only the precondition 
but also the dimension of freedom. The community is central in ensuring the development of a 
rational person with capacity for choice which the liberal see as what constitutes freedom It is 
the proper condition within which rationality is achieved. 
Liberalism, with its Kantian foundations, attaches priority to the self at the expense of 
all communal ends and purposes. This self achieves freedom in an arrangement that is neutral 
and indifferent to any question about the human good. It exalts only the right of individuals to 
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pursue their own conceptions of what is good, in fact 'beneficial' for themselves, within the 
societal framework (ibid.). In the Hegelian sense it is difficult for the Kantian self to have any 
sense of good without embedded-ness in the union of shared ethical beliefs. Therefore, the 
possibility is for the individual to evaluate anything as good on the basis of its benefits for the 
individual self which would includes the maintenance of that arrangement (ibid). 
Hegel's account of the evolution of mutual recognition is an important factor in the 
realization of individual freedom within the societal structure. This is the process which 
develops a consciousness for the need for interdependence in order to realize freedom. 
Hegel begins this process at an encounter between two agents, each understanding himself as 
being-for-self, that is, having a subjective point of view on the world (Pinkard, 1996:59). This 
encounter between the two agents cannot be solved by the death of another, it can only be 
resolved when the life of each is preserved in the struggle for recognition. In this struggle one 
must accept the point of view ofthe other as a slave. The master can only be the master 
because of the recognition he receives from the slave. He is dominant as the slave recognizes 
his point of view as dominant (ibid). This becomes the struggle for recognition of each by the 
other, meaning that the fact that the slave accepted the master's point of view at the initial 
stages, does not cast these relations in stone. Different dynamics develop in this relationship as 
the slaves' consciousness develops through the stages (ibid, p.61). This consciousness 
develops in the stages of history which he classified under different epochs such as stoicism, 
skepticism and unhappy consciousness, which we are not going to discuss in this paper. 
In these stages freedom begins by existing only in thought and is worked by historical 
developments such as the Reformation and the French Revolution which Hegel maintains as 
important for the development of the consciousness of freedom for the Western subject 
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(Pinkard, 1996: 64-78). In unhappy consciousness as the last stage freedom was understood 
to be in waiting to be redeemed by a distant, divine point of view (God). This is transformed 
when a concept of "universal will" develops which is a conception of a shared point of view 
that is developed by human activity. This does exist in trying to disavow the subjective point 
of view for the universal that exists somewhere as an abstract entity but by fusing them into a 
unity. This is the desired condition of mutual recognition which thrives in ethical life 
(Pinkard, 1996: 77). 
K warne Gyekye, an African communitarian, presents two concepts of community 
which will be important for our understanding of the difference in the conceptions we have 
just discussed (Coetzee, 2000a: 47). These are the "associative" and the "aggregative" 
concepts of community. The associative conception is the understanding of community as the 
collective that is constituted by patterns of interpersonal relationships and that this association 
is structured by these relationships, with the sociological, cultural and traditional rules which 
are implied and reproduced only to strengthen the make-up of the association (ibid.) 
He argues (ibid.) that "these relationships are regulated by culturally reinforced 
reciprocities, comprehensive interactions, and mutual sympathies and responsibilities". This 
conception of community is relevant to the one envisaged by Hegel. It is the only kind of 
community that would seem to operate on the basis of the union of shared ethical beliefs that 
have developed in common cultural history and the deep relationality of the individual -
needed for the development of a sense of civic identity. This means that as individuals have the 
same cultural history and as they interact values develop which are shared because of the 
common experience. This is a pre-requisite for the development of sociality in the process of 
constituting the self 
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The aggregative concept of community can be identified with the Kantian forms of liberalism 
discussed in this chapter. This conception views the community as an aggregate of individuals, 
"treated as separate units contributing arithmetically to the whole and have interests 
contingently rather than constitutively connected "(ibid, p.48). This is going to form the crux 
of the discussion of the linking of communitarianism and African philosophy that will be taken 
up later in this paper. 
Hegel implicitly reinforces the importance of the formative role of history in the 
construction of the self(Smith, 1989: 235). The individual found at the 'end of history' in 
Hegel is situated in the society and the societal climate which are a culmination of the process 
which took place prior to him, these come to permeate him and thus shape him. Hegel's Geist 
(Spirit) objectitying himself in the world would successfully achieve the end point of this 
development in that era (pinkard, 1996) 
Therefore, the individual self in that era stands at the culmination of the process which he 
could not have by any chance reflected on, controlled or chosen but penetrates his identity all 
the same.) 
In this sense individual identities (linked to the sense of self), which are essential for the 
choices one makes, "are bound up with our individual life histories and the histories of the 
peoples and the cultures to which we are attached" (ibid.). For Hegel individuals are what they 
are by their existence in community (Taylor, 1984: 181). He asserts that everything that a man 
has become he owes from his inherence from the community. 
All value or quality a man embodies, according to Hegel, he has through the state (political 
community) and "an individual is an individual in this substance" (ibid). 
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This is in many ways concurs with the age-old phrase which has captured African 
philosophical vision of communitarianism: 'umntu ngumntu ngabantu' ( a person is a person 
through persons). It basically summarizes the view that in order for an individual to reach the 
fullness of personhood as conceptualized in African philosophy, interpersonal relationships and 
sociality are central necessities. 
Hegel associated ethical society with the classical Greek polis. In this community, the 
norms and ends that are expressed in public life are the most important for the citizens and are 
central in the definition of their identity (ibid, p.185). In this community, the institutional 
arrangements in which individuals cannot but find themselves in, is not felt as foreign, as an 
intruder in the realm of individual freedom. This means that individuals do not experience 
community as an inhibition in their individual lives but as a necessity for the actualisation of 
their real freedom. The community is the essence of the self (ibid.). This essence is sustained 
by the activity, the affirmative participation of the citizens, they see this as their work -
universal work which creates and re-creates itself through the actions of each of all (ibid.). 
This is what makes the ethical community a proper condition of freedom. In this sense, 
freedom exists in the harmony between social necessity and individual freedom. 
Rationality flourishes in being rooted in the 'essence' . The objective (which is the self-
existence ofthe political community with the life of its own, created and maintained by the 
affirmative participation of individual citizens) and the subjective will are then reconciled in 
Hegel, and form one and the same, indivisible, "untroubled whole" (ibid, p.186). This view 
promotes the assertion that community is not, therefore, a mere instrument or a precondition 
of freedom but its central dimension. 
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Hegel argues that when citizens stop identifying with the nonns and ends of the 
community, when they begin to 'reflect,3, when they tum back on themselves and see 
themselves as individuals with individual goals, that leads to the dissolution of the ethical 
community. This is the condition that necessitates the dissolution of the political community 
and its life (ibid). This view is very important in strengthening the communitarian argument as 
a whole. Crowley (1987:211) concurs when he argues that an individual cannot easily discard 
many of his attributes (acquired in the pre-reflective customs of the community) without 
calling his individual identity fundamentally into question, in which case then he undermines 
the framework that is absolutely necessary for his freedom. 
This is the foundation upon which many communitarian thinkers base their 
communitarian theories. The general exposition of these theories together with those of other 
communitarians we undertake to represent in the next section. 
GENERAL EXPOSITION 
The main objective of this section is to discuss communitarian theory that emanates 
from the above foundations in general as a critique of liberalism. In the last section the focus 
was on presenting Hegelian foundations of communitarianism with its implications for a 
different conception of rationality from that ofliberalism. That has already set the tone for the 
3Hegel was not necessarily against the practice of reflecting. For Hegel, the community 
reflected through historical practices and the institutions of art, philosophy and religion. 
Religion, for instance, helped the community to reflect on its absolute principles governing life 
(Pinkard, 1996:221-222). It is important to note that this fonn of reflection is a communal 
practice and assist the community constitute its identity (ibid). 
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controversy between liberalism and communitarianism. 
Communitarianism attacks liberalism on two levels. The first level is methodological 
and the second is normative (Avineri & De-Shalit, 1992: 2). At the methodological level, 
communitarians argue that the premise ofliberal individualism such as the rational individual 
(found in Kant) who chooses freely are false because the social, cultural and historical 
contexts that are required for the development of such attributes in human behaviour are 
neglected (ibid). 
At the normative level, communitarians argue that the premises of individualism have 
to result in morally unsatisfactory consequences (ibid). These consequences are subjects empty 
of moral character as a result of being thinly constituted (Crowley, 1987: 219). Crowley (ibid) 
argues that if an individual chooses the kind of life to lead and the values to have, that must 
necessarily be set against the background of (moral) ties and commitments which he did not 
choose, but which give moral substance to his choices. This is the problem present at the level 
of the normative critique against liberalism. These two aspects of the communitarian critique 
ofliberalism challenge the two aspects in post-Enlightenment liberalism which were raised at 
the beginning of this chapter. Those are 'self-assertion' and 'self-foundation' which are 
challenged at the methodological and normative levels respectively by the communitarian 
critics. 
These are the two themes that emerge from our discussion. Walzer (1994: 242) argues 
that what moves the communitarian critique in liberal society is fragmentation which is the 
exact opposite of the community - "the home of coherence, connection, and narrative 
capacity". The life that the individual living in this fragmented society as a self-willing, free 
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individual reduces the idea of society to the co-existence of separate selves that are only joined 
at the level of contract (ibid.). 
In liberal society the life of an individual is expressed in the language of utilities for the 
individual self and the language of rights (ibid). In the light of this diagnosis, one might 
suggest that in a society like that, where there is no consensus on the conceptions of good, the 
liberal society might be the solution. This is because in that situation a procedural republic' 
would be an absolute necessity to maintain justice (ibid, p.243). 
Justice, in this sense, is not understood as having any moral content. It is upholding and 
protecting of all the values individuals choose balanced with the harm principle. 
This suggestion seeks to undermine the communitarian argument raised above on the 
basis of the fact that if they understand the liberal society to be fragmented there is no point of 
trying to return to the "lost Eden" (ibid). The best thing to do is to service the fragmentation 
by invoking a just liberal society which might just save the fragmented society from 
degeneration. The problem with this is that it would then mean that the atomistic nature of the 
liberal society discussed by Taylor (1985: 187) is not a problem for post-Enlightenment liberal 
theory but the most desirable state of affairs as long as the harm principle is upheld. 
The above line of argument is diluted· by the second argument posited by the 
communitarians. Communitarians assert that liberal theory and the society they advocate 
misrepresents real life. This argument is in line with the aspect of 'self-foundation' in 
'The procedural republic is an arrangement where "society is an association of 
individuals, each of whom has a conception of good or worthwhile life and, correspondingly, a 
life plan. The function of society (republic) ought to be to facilitate these life plans, as much as 
possible and following some principle ofjustice"(Taylor, 1995: 186). 
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Enlightenment liberalism. It leads us to discussions about the constitution of the self, the 
process by which an individual is founded. 
This has come out numerous times in this paper and for me is the most powerful of the 
communitarian criticisms which the liberals cannot avoid. It argues that people loose from all 
social ties, unencumbered, with each being the one and the only inventor, 'founder' of his life, 
with no criteria at all are mythical characters (Walzer, 1994: 243). This is about the 
conception of self. In this liberal understanding, the self is prior to its ends and in that way, it is 
morally bankrupt, without character and depth because these are acquired or develop from 
being embedded in society (Baynes, 1990:65). 
The communitarians such as Taylor and Sandel (ibid, p.66) have presented an 
alternative conception of the self. They argue that human beings are 'self-interpreting animals' , 
this means that their relation to their ends is not just about weighing their preferences, but the 
process of interpreting and evaluating those ends constitutes who they are. This emphasizes 
that the process of deciding the courses of action to take is moral, context-bound, and any 
attempt to transcend it would result in the fragmentation of the very basis of community. 
McIntyre (Mulhall & Swift, 1992: 71) concurs with this view. The reason for liberals 
advocating this conception of self comes from the understanding that individuals cannot agree 
on a conceptions of the good (ibid, p. 72). This is true, but it is because the liberal self does 
not have any moral framework upon which to base his conception of good. If the liberal 
individual was situated in community he would be embedded in it together with other actors 
and disagreement would not be far apart that a consensus based on shared understandings 
cannot be reached. This is what Bell (1993 : 63-64) attempts to spell out. He introduces the 
idea of substantial agreement which is based on shared meanings. Shared meanings, for Bell 
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(ibid) does not refer to agreements of the community or consensus on certain issue they may 
be lobbying at a particular point in time but "an authoritative interpretation of community 
morality that bears on the proper character of the community". This idea then limits the 
understanding of the moral status of the certain thing to the moral context or community 
within which it is interpreted. 
In liberal thought one must abstract himself from the community's shared meanings in order to 
be able to criticize the community rationally. This is what constitute moral freedom (ibid, 
p.64). This assumes that there are universal standards which one can employ to criticize any 
community. Bell (ibid) argues that it is necessary for one to hold a universal view of morality 
to criticize the community. This approach believes that there are objective and universal 
standpoints that should be applicable to all societies. For me Kantian rationality attempts to 
express just this. In this view, Bell argues, one appeals to universal principles that are 
independent of any social or cultural particularities (ibid). The second view which is 
appropriate to the communitarian standpoint views critical standard to be drawn from the 
communities shared meanings of a particular society rather than from an external, impersonal 
imposition (ibid). 
The latter view allows a communitarian to argue that one can then invoke a common good or 
to be fair, an agreement on the conceptions of good. This, however, may raise the problem of 
relativism. For an example this argument has been used by African leaders against the idea of 
universal human rights. They argue that they have their own understanding of human rights 
which is not necessarily the one Western powers claim to be universal (Howard, 1986). 
In the first section we have discussed Hegel's understanding of community as entailing 
the union of shared ethical beliefs. This is pursued by McIntyre (ibid, p. 93) more than any 
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other communitarian thinker. For McIntyre the very failure ofliberalism to acknowledge the 
constitutive attachments of individuals to their communities has resulted in them invoking the 
impossibility of these individuals agreeing on the common conception of good (ibid) . 
For McIntyre (1984: 127), what an individual is doing can only be intelligible in his 
context, within a narrative. This has an important bearing on the conception of selfhood. He 
argues (ibid) that a correct conception of self must have its unity residing in "the unity of a 
narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end". He (ibid, 
p.128) uses the term of a 'setting' to illustrate this point. A setting may be an institution, a 
social milieu of a human being. This setting has a history, it is within this history that the 
histories ofthe individuals are situated. Without this 'situation', the history ofthe individual 
and its changes would be confused. This means that if an individual's history is not placed 
within this larger picture, he will not have the capacity for self-understanding (social identity) 
necessary to enable himself to choose in any serious sense. 
This is in line with Crowley's (1987:212) understanding of the function of reason as 
the "faculty which allows us to integrate that self knowledge (acquired through our 
experiences), to make it our own and construct from it an articulated understanding of 
ourselves, of our deepest values". 
The simple understanding of this is that we may choose against the background of un chosen 
foundation. But it is important to understand this clearly. It is not the endorsement of 
totalitarianism but an attempt to explain "the process governing the formation of individual 
selves" capable of making moral choice and the sense in which they can be said to be free. 
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This discussion leads us to a point which will be examined in the next chapter about cultural 
universals and particulars and the idea that there are elements of particularity and universality 
in every culture, which may lead us to conclude that intersections exist, as a common place 
between cultures (Wiredu, 1996: 20). 
CONCLUSION: LIBERAL RESPONSES 
The communitarian critique ofliberalism resulted in a number of replies from contemporary 
liberal theorists, some of which are mentioned in the previous section. It also prompted some 
to rethink liberal theories. Kymlicka (Brown, 1994: 18) argues that liberalism does not deny 
the need for the social world in an individual's life, but attempts to understand and encourage 
human capacity to question the appropriateness of a particular social context. What is at stake 
in this debate is the 'human capacity' and the implication that it is a given fact rather than a 
product of a developmental process. 
Liberalism rejects the idea that is associated with communitarian critics, such as 
Crowley (1987: 211), that individuals are embedded in a social context and while being able to 
make sense and interpret their social relationships, they cannot transcend or reject them 
because they embody their identity (Brown, 1994: 18). Liberals argue that individuals are 
capable of questioning and rejecting their social situation (ibid.) Kymlicka (ibid) argues that: 
We can and do make sense of questions not just about 
the meaning ofthe roles and attachments we find ourselves in, 
but also their value. 
The problem here still is that it seems as though the appropriateness ofthe particular social 
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context and its value seems to be measured by and decided on the basis of its instrumentality 
for the individual. To this Gauthier (1992: 157) argues that in defending the normative priority 
of the individual to community, liberalism does not imply anything about the causal basis of 
individuality nor does it (liberalism) reject it. He argues (ibid) that the self-consciousness that 
is necessary for an individual to have a genuine self-conception may only be possible as the 
result of socialization. 
Gutmann (1992 : 128) provides a more serious challenge to communitarian political thought. 
She argues that communitarians such as McIntyre and Sandel see the moral universe in 
dualistic terms. They encourage one to see it as either our identities are independent of our 
ends which leaves us unencumbered selves or they are constituted in community, leaving us 
encumbered by the socially determined life plans. 
These are both extremes because what the communitarians criticize in liberalism, the 
primacy-of-rights that produces an unencumbered self, they have the same problem, which for 
them is the self that is encumbered by socially dictated ends. This may result in cultural 
oppression that may be carried out in the name of maintaining valued ends such as protecting 
the moral fabric of society. This society would be static, because if it there is social change the 
individual taking the first step would suffer. Gutmann (ibid) argues that these communitarians 
miss the appeal of liberals to reconcile the competing conceptions of good. 
Lastly, according to Gutmann (ibid, p.l30), it is Sandel who argues that the main concern of 
communitarianism is the concentration of power in the hands of corporate economy, the 
bureaucratic state and the dwindling of the intermediate forms of community that are 
important for encouraging active public life. She continues to advance the position that 
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communitarianism has no point in undennining liberal values but its good use is recovering 
politics that liberalism has lost. These are broad based communities like civil societies which 
are not based on necessarily eroding the liberal state but which enliven them (ibid). 
Communitarianism is valuable for highlighting the fragmenting effect of individualist 
morality in society. This discussion is going to enable us to open a dialogue between 
communitarianism which has foundations in Hegelian ethical life working within German 
idealism and African philosophy which developed from African professional philosopher's 
attempts to extract what is of philosophical relevance in the traditions, cultures of the African 
cultural communities. This seeks to compare the two and identifY the common ground 
between them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNITARIANISM: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
Dark Africa? 
Who nursed the doubtful child of civilization, 
On the wand' ring banks of life-giving Nile, 
And gave the teeming nations of the West 
A Grecian gift? 
Micheal Dei-Anang 
This chapter discusses African communitarianism in contemporary African philosophy. This 
will entail the exposition of the African philosophical perspective of communitarianism. Here, 
the African concept of personhood is central. The centrality of this concept is necessitated by, 
according to Berlin (in Gaus, 1983: v), the fact that the ideas of every philosopher concerned 
with human affairs rests on the conceptions of what Man is. Therefore, it is important to grasp 
this central image, which may be implicit, but which detennines the picture of the world. 
African communitarianism rests on the processual view of the self. This view understands 
personhood as attained and that ''the self is a person only as socially embedded individual" 
(Coetzee, 2000a: 56). 
It is essential to define Afiican philosophy before undertaking this task. Serequeberhan (1991: 
38) asserts that all cultures deal with the same philosophical issues which are universal. 
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It is worth to noting that even though they are universal, they differ in how each culture traces 
the unity of these themes, synthesizes and organises them based on their conception oflife, 
namely the inter-relation between objects and persons and between persons themselves. 
Serequeberhan (ibid) establishes the necessity of talking about a particularly African 
philosophy (or African perspective of issues in the realm of philosophy) and its difference to 
other philosophies. He (ibid) argues that we can and should be able to talk about an African 
philosophy because African culture has its own way of establishing order, its own view of life. 
According to Georg Misch (ibid) life is a starting point of philosophy, that is life as lived and 
embodied in the world in which human beings live and move. 
Without assuming any homogeneity in African culture or thought, there is, however, one 
central theme running through Mrican philosophy and that is communalism 
(communitarianism1). Existence-in-relation sums up the African conception oflife and reality 
(ibid, pAO). African thought holds that created beings preserve a bond with one another. 
Serequeberhan (ibid) argues that an African feels and knows himself to be in intimate and 
personal relationship with others in a community, he attains growth and recognition by how 
well he fulfills a function (inseparable with his being) for the overall well-being ofthe 
community. It is this theme in African philosophy that is important for our discussion. 
lThese terms can be used interchangeably. 
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This thesis understands African philosophy as systematised writings of modern Afiican 
professional philosophers who examine traditional thought and culture and from these extract 
issues relevant for philosophy>' This does not refer to traditional assertions that lack the 
analytical dimension and argumentative justification because, without these there is no 
philosophy (Wiredu, 1998: 196), Wiredu continues to say that if any philosopher is 
undertaking a comparative work between Afiican and Western philosophy, which is the object 
of this thesis, "they will have to look at the philosophy that Afiicans are producing today"(ibid, 
p.197), rather than African folk thought. 
The discussion of Afiican philosophical perspective of communitarianism must entail a closer 
look at the notion of rationality found in it. Rationality can be defined as a basic quality that all 
human beings are thought to share in common and a principle that governs their behaviour 
(Sogolo, 1998: 217). Taylor (1985: 134) posits the two senses ofrationality. Rationality is 
seen as logical consistency at the level of thought and secondly, as instrumental self-interested 
action. Afiican philosophers, in discussing rationality, emphasize the role oflanguage and the 
social thesis (importance of the sociality aspect of persons) as important. This perspective will 
argue for the understanding of rationality that is partly embedded in cultural structures from 
which it derives many normative nuances (Coetzee, 2000a: 12). 
THE AFRICAN CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD 
2 Coetzee and Roux (1998: 451) understand this trend of philosophy of Afiican 
philosophy to be universal and critical, "favouring second-order evaluation of first -order 
claims about Afiican cultural heritage and worldview". 
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Afiican thought differs with the Western views of understanding the individual. The Western 
liberal view abstracts a certain feature of the human individual, such as rationality and 
proceeds to make it the defining characteristic for individuality (Menkiti, 1984: 171). In 
Kantian philosophy this feature is the individual possession of rational will and in Marx it is an 
individual's potentiality to master nature and himself (Agrawal, 1998: 152). These writers 
recognise the value of human life, the moral worth or autonomy and understand this value to 
derive from the consideration of specific facts about the nature of the individual person (ibid). 
This contrasts with the African view ofthe human individual. This view denies that persons 
can be defined by working certain physical or psychological characteristic of the individual 
(Menkiti, 1984: 171). 
In this view the self is defined by reference to the community. This African view of the se\fis 
summed up in J.S. Mbiti's (1969) famous statement: "I am because we are, and since we are, 
therefore I am" (ibid). This simple understanding posits the reality that the communal world 
takes priority over the reality of the individual life histories (ibid). Menkiti continues to argue 
that "it is in rootedness in an ongoing community that the individual comes to see himself as a 
man" (ibid, p.ln). This means that in order for the individual self to understand itself (as a 
self), he must be immersed in community and it is here that he is constituted as a self, with 
language spoken in his specific human community contributing to his understanding of his 
moral concepts and all other requirements associated with progression to full personhood 
(ibid). 
In this view, it is not the natural static quality such as rationality or will that defines a person 
(ibid). In African thought it is through immersion in the community that one comes to acquire 
the human conceptual framework of thought (Agrawal, 1998: 153). It is important to note that 
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the assertion that the human conceptual framework of thought is acquired and does not get 
installed in its full content on arrival to the human community. Rather, it is a process of 
incremental development until one reaches full personhood, which manifests in the way he 
fulfills responsibilities within his community In clarifying this fact Menkiti (ibid, p.I72), asserts 
that the processual view of man in Afiican thought means that a person before attaining full 
personhood goes through "a long process of social and ritual transformation until he attains 
the full complement of excellencies seen as truly definitive of man". The excellencies that are 
definitive of Man include the commitment of communal well-being and fulfilment ofthe 
community prescribed norms. 
For Menkiti (ibid, p .173) individuals may fail to attain personhood. He continues to say that 
because ofthis possibility the Afiican community emphasised the rituals of incorporation and 
the necessity oflearning social rules. This leads to the attainment of the social self-hood, that is 
a communal self. The suggestion by Menkiti (ibid) that personhood is something at which 
individual could fail to attain is controversial. If the attainment of full personhood relies on 
acquiring the excellencies seen as truly definitive of Man, which involves commitment to 
communal well-being, this may result in the community revoking the rights of mentally 
disabled people and those who do not fulfill community standards. But this will be followed 
later in this thesis. 
Gbadegesin (1998: 292) develops the idea that rituals of incorporation are necessary for the 
attainment of social-selfhood. He (ibid) argues that to better understand the making of the 
social self, it is important to understand the processes that are undertaken in the coming-to-
being of the new -born into the extended family structure. Gbadegesin (ibid) discusses this 
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with specific reference to Y oruba culture. In the arrival ofthe baby, the experienced elderly 
wives serve as midwives and also make sure that the baby is taken care of (ibid). On the eighth 
day, a ceremony is organised for the naming of the baby by the baby's grandfather, who then 
consults oracles to find out the child's future. In this process it is worth noting that the naming 
of the child is an engagement ofthe whole family. The baby from the youngest age gets 
immersed in the collective culture. Secondly, the name of the child is selected according to the 
situation of the family and its traditions. His name, therefore, can only be understood in 
relation to the family history, traditions, tragedies etc (ibid). 
His name is expected to be a constant reminder, guide that reminds and connects him with the 
family and the circumstances of his birth (ibid, p.293). This is the stuff of anthropology and the 
philosophy of culture but the issue is relevant to this chapter in that it raises the consciousness 
of the child as a member of his family, his position in it and his community in general (ibid). 
In this context, the child is brought up by his family involving step-moms and the men in the 
family who approve and disapprove of the different aspects of the child' s behaviour (ibid). 
Therefore, in these rituals of incorporating the child into the coming-to-being process, it is 
clear how the life-plans and life decisions are partly formed in and by the community from the 
consultation of oracles and the social milieu within which the child is brought up. 
Menkiti (1984: 173) argues that the older an individual gets, the more he fulfils the 
requirements of personhood. This does not only refer to growth in wisdom but to acquiring 
the 'excellencies' definitive of personhood (ibid). This is a potential problem in Afiican 
philosophy. Didier Kaphagwani (in Kigongo, 1992: 61) says that this understanding of the 
elderly having acquired the characteristics of full personhood results in epistemological 
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authoritarianism as they are the only ones who are said to have the wisdom and the 
knowledge. This epistemological authoritarianism arguably is the basic cause of political 
authoritarianism in the modern context (ibid, p. 62). This is the understanding of elders as 
Plato's 'philosopher-kings'. This is problematic because it is a form of indirect coercion, and is 
inimical to growth of individuality (self-hood). It denied the young the critical appraisal of the 
social system and deprived them of cognitive active participation in it (ibid, p.62). 
To illustrate the processual view of personhood, Menkiti (1984: 173) makes reference to 
natural tendency of using the pronoun 'it' when referring to newborns and infants in English. 
This is normally used to refer to inanimate objects. It would not be used to refer to grown 
persons. Though a personal pronoun such as 'he' or ' she' can also be used in referring to 
children, Menkiti (ibid) argues that this flexibility of referential designation being possible with 
regard to children at earlier stages of human persons but not with the later stages has 
significance that is worth keeping in mind as having implications for the understanding of 
children with incomplete self-hood (ibid, p.174). This view is challenged by Gyekye (1998) -
an African philosopher who offers a more relational view of the self - one which follows the 
Western communitarians. 
Menkiti (ibid), by drawing attention to the natural tendency to use 'it' for infants illustrates the 
view that personhood is acquired in community. Gyekye (1998: 322) argues that the point that 
Menkiti wants to make is that the use of the pronoun 'it' for infants means that they are not yet 
persons because they have not yet been embedded in community and, therefore, the 
community has not conferred personhood on them. This is problematic because it would seem 
to destroy the basis for respect and the dignity of children's lives. Also problematic for Gyekye 
(ibid) is the fact that Menkiti makes this inference and attributes to African thought this idea 
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based on an analysis of a characteristic of English grammar. 
For Gyekye (ibid, p. 319), Menkiti's account of personhood in African philosophy is 
"overstated and not entirely correct, and require some amendments and refinements". The 
problem with this view is that it has parallels in the conceptions of the social status of the 
person held by scholars of African socialism3. 
This understanding of personhood would produce the kind of community which is inimical to 
the well-being of individual persons. Gyekye's problem is the understanding of personhood as 
something that is achieved at the later stages of life - the view which understates other features 
in an individual person which are biologically given but definitive of the person. Contested here 
is Menkiti' s processual understanding of personhood. 
According to Gyekye (ibid, p.320) communitarianism sees the human person as an inherently 
communal being, embedded in the web of social relationships and interdependence and never 
as an atomic individual. It is, therefore, important to note that this view of a human person 
informs an understanding of the community not as mere aggregate of atomistic individuals 
whose interests are "contingently congruent", but as a group of persons linked by interpersonal 
3 African Socialism was drawn from Marxism and because of the similarity of the 
African communal structure with the vision of Marxism, it was possible to import socialism as 
the answer in restoring the original pre-colonial African community. According to Bwalya 
(Van Niekerk, 1998) it was a response to specific needs that arose out of the prevailing 
circumstances of decolonisation. This view drawn from the ancient African social order, in its 
traditional setting, and was easily translated it to modern socialism, which put absolutely no 
value in an individual person (Gyekye, 1998). 
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bonds, who see themselves as primarily members of the group and share values and goals 
(ibid). The reason why the understanding of personhood is the issue in African thought is the 
fact that the understanding of community will emerge from such a view. 
Ifwe see individuals as atomistic then that will have implications for the kind of community we 
envisage, but if we see the individual as a non-person until the community confers personhood 
upon him, that will have implications, often dangerous, for the kind of community we 
envisage. 
This is why it is vital for any kind of understanding of human persons to be critically appraised. 
"The notion of common interests and values is crucial to an adequate conception of 
community; that notion in fact defines community" (ibid). It is argued that it is this notion that 
will differentiate the real community from the mere aggregative association of individuals 
(ibid). 
Gyekye (ibid, p.320) presents six propositions that are necessarily implications of the 
understanding of the human person as communitarian by virtue of being born into the existing 
community, and of his natural sociality. These are as follows: 
1. The human person does not voluntarily choose to enter into human community, 
that is, communal life is not optional for any individual person. 
2. The human person is at once a cultural being. 
3. The human person cannot - perhaps must not live in isolation from other 
persons. 
4. The human person naturally connects with others and must have relationship 
with them. 
5. Social relationships are not contingent but necessary. 
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6. Following from (4) and (5) the person is constituted, only partly by social 
relationship in which he/she necessarily finds him/herself. 
The fact that the person is partly and not wholly constituted by social relationships is crucial 
for Gyekye to illustrate the watered down understanding of personhood and the community's 
role as only in part rather than in totality as envisaged by Menkiti (1984). 
It is essential that a consideration to other aspects of human nature is made, because though 
the human person bears natural sociality, "he or she is by nature other things as well" (ibid, 
p.322).The failure to consider other aspects of the human person will result "in investing the 
community's will all-engulfing moral authority to determine everything in the life ofthe 
individual" (ibid). What "other things" is Gyekye referring to in the above-mentioned passage? 
By these Gyekye (p. 326) refers to such attributes of the person as rationality, a capacity, or 
perhaps potential capacity, for virtue and for making and evaluating moral judgements and 
hence the human person is capable of choice. "It is not the community that creates these 
attributes; the community discovers and nurtures them"(ibid) . 
Therefore, the problem with Menkiti (1984) is the way he exaggerates the role of the 
community in the constitution of the human person. Secondly, the implication that newborns 
have non-person status is problematic because it fails to recognise other attributes in human 
persons which only exist in potentiality. Because, even though in a newborn the excellencies 
definitive of personhood have not yet manifested, they only exist in potential form and the 
function of the community is not to create them but to provide the developmental context. 
Agrawal (1998: 153) argues that to attain the consciousness of self-hood as a person requires 
one to have been submitted to the "personifying process of human relationships" . 
It is important to highlight two issues in this. The first is the attainment of consciousness of 
50 
L 
self-hood and the second, is the personifYing process of social relationships. These both take 
place in the network of human relationships. 
I suggest that the first issue is about the process of constitution ofthe self in the community 
that gives one the ability to make choices. This is the process of actualisation of the self within 
the social and the cultural context provided by the community. The second, is simply the 
process of socialisation, the process by which an individual acquires values and norms that 
define what being human is for a particular community. 
This leads to the discussion of the factors that are essential for the personifYing process to take 
its course in African communities. It is vital, however, to understand that this is not the 
process of construction of the person as if the human is non-person on arrival to the 
community. This is the process of the discovery and development of the social which the 
human person gets submitted to choicelessly. Coetzee(1998: 276) argues that African 
philosophy develops from culture, there is no African philosophy which is not a product of 
cultural construction. Although, this might be true of philosophies originating in other parts of 
the world, African philosophy is more linked to culture than others. This is true especially for 
the section of African philosophy we are dealing with here. This implies cultural relativism 
which will be discussed further on. 
There are four concepts discussed by Coetzee (ibid, p.276-277) which can be seen as essential 
for the development of shared understandings in cultural community within which humans are 
embedded. The first concept is culture. African philosophy understands culture as a resource 
of social meanings upon which members of the community draw to mediate the contingencies 
of their everyday lives (ibid). It is a resource for the material and moral worlds ofthe 
community and it is through these that a certain group of people understand themselves as a 
/~:-~ -;~:::~~~~~ 
/' h;·dJUt.:.0 \ 
{ UN ;VERSITY' l~:~ 
51 
specific cultural community or group. 
A culture of reciprocity emerge within a community from that understanding, forwarded by 
Coetzee (ibid), that "they owe to each other mutual provision of all those things for the sake of 
which they have separated themselves from everyone else and joined forces in the particular 
community which they in fact make up". This means that a culture is important for the 
emergence of identity of a group of people as a community, and this group having delimited 
itself as a cultural community would seek mutual provision for all those resources, material or 
otherwise, which are particular for them. It is from this that a special commitment and 
developed sense of common life develop. This is the second concept and it is what constitutes 
an association of men and women as a community (ibid) . This shows the necessity of 
developed shared understanding which is the pretext for the African philosophy' s 
communitarian self. 
It is a common fact that culture is a dynamic phenomenon. Therefore, a human person gets 
embedded in a culture and a community she/he did not choose from birth, and these are 
important for the constitution of self-hood. But, it is important to note that this culture is not 
crystallised but those persons also get involved in the creation of their own commonality and 
identity as culture adapts with time. The third is the concept of ' dialogical relation' . Coetzee 
(ibid) argues that the members in community are in a dialogical relation to each other. This is 
the interactive context through which members actualise their social identity and serves as a 
determinant of choice. This means that individual persons in the community, who are social in 
character, create their commonality through this process of dialogical relation. This leads to 
the conclusion that it is possible to establish conceptions of good that would come to be 
accepted through this interactive network. 
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He continues to argue that it is only within a culturally specified range of options that an 
individual person can make a choice, for instance about life plans. This is important to show 
the impossibility of atomism for the communal self 
In the previous passage, both identity and subsequently choice is infonned by community's 
culture. It is argued that this is possible through the function of traditions. This is the fourth 
concept. Coetzee (ibid, p.277) defines tradition as "a historically extended socially embedded 
narrative about the systems of thought (moral, political, epistemological) and social practices 
of a specific community" . This definition links to the discussion of culture as dynamic. If 
culture is dynamic, traditions, being important as historically extended narratives are crucial for 
creating interpretative continuity in contemporary community. Traditions are, therefore, 
constitutive of moral and political precepts (ibid). This discussion means that human persons 
carmot know their good prior to social interaction ( community) and then it follows that their 
good is bound as a matter of consequence to the good of the community. Coetzee (1998) as 
an Africanist scholar presents these concepts in attempting to conceptualise African 
philosophical assertions in modern social theoretical language. 
The factors that are significant for the development of social meaning all hinge on the 
interaction of human persons. This is what Kwasi Wiredu (1996: 13) refers to as the concept 
of human communication. Communication is the transference of a thought content, the 
expression of an attitude, an emotion from one person or group of persons to another (ibid). 
The transference of thought content invites evaluation in tenns of its truth or falsity and the 
transference of expression of an attitude, emotion or wish requires evaluation of a different 
nature, that is, in tenns of a variety of nonnative concepts (ibid). 
Language, for Wiredu (ibid), is the central vehicle of human communication, and language has 
a variety of mediums such as words, gestures, and artifacts. This is noteworthy because these 
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language mediums exist and make sense within a particular culture. The concept of human 
communication is crucial to allow for the creation of shared meanings and understandings. 
This is interesting because it implies that these shared meanings are continually negotiated and 
re-negotiated in culture or community within which and individual exists. Wiredu (ibid) argues 
that there is no human community that can continue to exist without human communication. 
Like Gyekye (1998), he understands community not as an aggregation of individuals "existing 
as windowless monads but of individuals as interacting persons, and an interaction can only be 
on the basis of shared meanings"(Wiredu, 1996: 13). A human being deprived ofthe basic 
necessity of being embedded in the socialising influence of communication will remain only 
biologically human, but mentally is bound to remain subhuman, because in the failure to 
understand what it is to be human. Therefore, Wiredu (ibid) understands human 
communication to be having a humanising influence on individuals. 
The human being is understood as being born with a biological make-up, but with no concepts, 
but within this biological make-up, there is an innate conceptual ability (ibid, p. 19). This 
concurs with Agrawal (1998: 153) in arguing that it is through immersion in the community 
that a person acquires the human conceptual frameworks of thought. Gyekye (1998) also 
understands an infant to only have the potentiality for grasping the moral 'excellencies' and 
because of that cannot be viewed as non-person as Menkiti implies in his discussion. 
Wiredu (1996 : 19) asserts that to possess a specific concept must entail some linguistic ability 
and such an ability, one cannot have prior to community because it is only a result oftraining. 
Human persons should first communicate in their cultural community and grasp concepts such 
as moral concepts within that culture. The problem would arise in that the cultures, for 
instance, in Africa are not homogenous. Therefore, the problem of relativism arises because 
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concepts understood in this sense become too relativistic and meanings are shared within very 
limited confines .. To answer to that, Wiredu (ibid, p.20) argues that there are elements of 
universality and elements of particularity in all cultures and what defines the human species 
accross the spectrum are the universals of culture. This does not solve the problem because, 
what defines human species will vary from culture to culture. This is problem will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapter. 
RATIONALITY 
The previous discussion has implications for the notion of rationality that informs African 
philosophy. The notion of rationality that is in African philosophy emerges from the 
understanding of person which is held. If the human person is understood as a social being, 
that acquires human conceptual framework only by being immersed in the human community, 
that must inform the understanding of rationality which is held. 
Rationality is an attribute that all Men are thought to have. And it is believed that their thought 
processes are governed by such principles (Sogolo, 1998: 217). It is believed that in some 
cultures these rational principles are well systematised and stated that individuals come to 
internalise them. This can be taken further to say that it is from these principles that govern 
thought processes that action is also determined. 
Rationality can be understood as logical consistency at the level ofthought, that is, one cannot 
confirm that something is p and not-p simultaneously, and the rationality can also be 
understood as self-interested or instrumental action at the level of action (Taylor, 1985: 134). 
This is the understanding of rationality in the Western context that is universalised. It is 
understood as the universal quality of all men. Therefore, the cultures that seem to be 
deviating from this understanding are irrational. This was the case in the emergence of the 
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work undertaken on African societies. The early works published on the indigenous African 
societies attempting to articulate the implied world views moral values and conceptual systems 
embedded in the particular cultural codes and customs were seen according to Western 
rationality as falling within the category of the irrational (Van der Merwe: 2000: 3). This was 
challenged with the rise ofthe understanding of rationality as situated. 
This is the concept of rationality which is compatible with African philosophy. Masolo (in Van 
der Merwe, 2000: 3) acknowledges Peter Winch as very important in challenging the 
universal notion of rationality and his work questioned "the uncritically assumed neutrality of 
the conceptual schemes and categories of (Western) anthropology and philosophy" and the 
claims of objectivity and universality of Western rationality. This leads us to conclude that 
rationality should be understood "in terms of the rules that give an action meaning in a 
particular context" (O,Neill, 1999: 16). In this, O'Neill (ibid) argues the role oflanguage is 
important. Citing Winch, O'Neill (ibid) argues that the concepts we have are necessary to 
make sense of the experience we have in the world, that is, our reality. This means that we are 
able to think and to act in the world within the language and the context in which we find 
ourselves. Therefore, rationality should be understood within that context. 
The concept of human communication is relevant to the understanding of rationality discussed 
above. If Wiredu' s assertion that human persons are born with only an innate capacity for 
grasping concepts in their biological make-up, and begin to develop concepts in the context of 
interaction in human community (Wiredu, 1996: 19), then it should be assumed that human 
beings are born with only a capacity for rationality which he comes to develop within the social 
context. This assertion can also be made in the light the point, by Agrawal (1998: 153) that a 
person acquires the characteristically human conceptual framework ofthought through 
immersion in the human community. These have implications for the rationality understood as 
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a faculty that deals with the thought processes, because thought process should entail ability to 
grasp concepts and reflect on them within the a particular human community. 
African philosophers, according to Coetzee (2000b: 12) have understood a significant truth, 
which is, that rationality is partly embedded in cultural structures from which it derives its 
normative nuances. It is important to note that it is only partly embedded and not totally 
embedded. This comes from Gyekye's (1998: 327) understanding of rationality as a basic 
quality of human beings. Although, it is not a quality definitive ofa person, it is part of it. That 
means that the human community does not create that attribute in human beings, but discovers 
and nurtures it. 
African philosophers emphasize the role oflanguage and the social thesis that individuals are 
social beings embedded in human community. 
It is, therefore, clear that the authority of a reason for an action is explained by appealing not 
only to biology, but the social origins of the norm that is held. "As culture-dependent norms 
they derive their authority from a socially shaped sensibility" (Coetzee, 2000b: 14). This means 
that a rational individual in society would act in terms of these socially-shaped particular 
sensibilities. This is important for rationality at the level of action because it means that though 
it has been argued in the Western tradition that rationality is given characteristic of a human 
individual it cannot be conceived of outside of the community. 
Coming back to the issue oflanguage. Language is understood by African philosophers such 
Gyekye and Wiredu as the most significant mediums through which people can understand and 
make sense of their world and through that world communicated to themselves and to others 
(ibid) 
It is argued that "all languages possess conceptual structures peculiar and even unique to 
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themselves, but these structures can be rendered communicable in other languages by dint of 
near-inter-translatability of all languages "(ibid, p.6). 
This is of great significance because the assertions about the importance of language in 
rationality cannot escape the problem of relativising rationality, which would make, I suppose, 
difficulty for inter-community relations. This is because languages are not fully inter-
translatable, and there are to some extent incommensurable conceptual frameworks (ibid, p.7). 
What is crucial about language is that "as a critical medium of convergence on contextualised 
truth, assuming inter-translatability, it opens rationality to cultural influences" (ibid). 
This is imperative because language is the medium through we make sense of our experiences, 
reflect and conceptualise our reality. The understanding emanating from this is that rationality 
being a human attribute, discovered and nurtured in human community, is partially constructed 
in the community and it can only determined within that particular context. A problem with 
this understanding has been raised in connection with relativism. Afiican philosophers attempt 
to answer this question by extracting in African cultures elements of particularity and of 
universality linked to Wiredu's concept of human communication (Wiredu, 1996). 
Wiredu's (ibid) concept of human communication is essential in attempting to solve the 
problem of relativism, which might impact negatively on the understanding of Afiican 
philosophy, owing to Afiica's heterogeneity. O'Neill (1999: 21) trying to explain this cites 
Habermas' critical theory. Habermas (in O'Neill, ibid) argues that there is always a possibility 
of a person to use language in trying to reach mutual understanding with another person or 
group in spite of vast cultural differences between them. 
Habermas' justification rests on the unique ability of human beings to use language in a 
communicative way, which is internal to all cultures (ibid). This latter part ofthis section 
points to the conclusions of this thesis . This is an attempt to reconcile different philosophical 
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traditions. This is what Taylor (in O'Neill, ibid, p. 20) called the 'fusion of horizons' which is 
defined as " the sharing of perspectives that we aspire to in our efforts to understand other 
cultures (philosophical traditions)". 
CONCLUSION 
African philosophical perspective of communitarianism or communalism is based on the 
understanding of the nature of the person and how a community follows on from that image 
they have of a human individual. Ifwe are discussing communitarian theory, we cannot avoid 
addressing the question of shared understandings and social meanings which for African 
philosophers is created by culture and taken forward by the understanding of human 
individuals as constituted and steeped in shared historical tradition. Modern African philosophy 
has attempted to move away from the assertions of African communalism which were based 
on mythico-religious assumptions and have tried to invoke philosophically defendable 
concepts. This has an important move from ethnophilosophy' to philosophy that can be eligible 
for engaging in dialogue with philosophies originating elsewhere. This is the object to be 
pursued in the following chapter. Wiredu (1998: 198) argues that it is important that the 
material on African philosophy be approached critically because all the peoples who have made 
4Ethnophilosophy uses religious, historical, poetical and moral texts and extract from 
these what is taken to be philosophy. Hountondji (1996: 179) argues that in the process of 
extracting philosophy from these they lose their original flavour and theoretical significance. 
Ethnophilosophers ignore the historical relativity of these texts produced at certain times by 
certain individuals with different motivations even within the same communities (ibid). 
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breakthrough in the quest for modernity have done so by going beyond folk thought. It is 
important that this discussion of African philosophy is followed by a critical evaluation of 
African philosophy which will be part of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITICAL EV ALUA TION AND SYNTHESIS 
Either follow tradition or else in what you do be consistent. In public 
matters you will be consistent if you do not translate word for word, not 
jump into narrow imitative groove, from which both fear and rules 
followed in the given work prevent your escape. 
Horace 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a critical evaluation of communitarianism and African 
philosophy. We will discuss the conceptual and political issues that flow out of these 
communitarian perspectives from two different worlds. This will lead us to making the 
conclusions that the three perspectives (liberalism, communitarianism and Afiican philosophy) 
discussed in this thesis can be reconciled. The previous two chapters demonstrated that 
communitarianism is identical to Afiican communalism (as it has been presented by modem 
Afiican philosophers) though they have different origins. What we are hoping to say at the end 
of this thesis is these similarities can be explored and a dialogue initiated between 
communitarianism and Afiican philosophy as a response to liberalism. 
The first step will entail the critical evaluation of the communitarian critique ofliberalism as 
discussed by Buchanan (1989) and the propositions that he attempts to defend. We then 
briefly discuss how these ideas compare with Afiican philosophy and how most of the 
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criticisms he presents apply to African philosophy as well. The second part will be a discussion 
of the problems in African philosophy as discussed by Howard (1986), Gyekye (1998), 
Kingongo (1992) and Kernohan (1998) that will allow for a reconciliation of Western and 
African perspectives. 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF COMMUNITARIANISM 
Buchanan (1989: 852) argues that communitarianism refers to a number of views that are not 
necessarily the same even though there are some common themes present in most ofthe 
important communitarian work. He (ibid) sums up the communitarian critique ofliberalism in 
five propositions. 
Firstly, communitarianism understands community as a fundamental and irreplaceable 
ingredient for the good life of human beings, and the problem with liberalism is that it devalues 
and undermines the role of community (ibid). Secondly, communitarianism sees full 
participation in the political life ofthe community as of fundamental importance. 
Consequently, the problem with liberalism is that, in viewing political association as 
instrumental, it undervalues political life.(ibid). 
Thirdly, liberalism fails to provide an adequate account ofthe importance of obligations and 
commitments that are not chosen under a contract such as familial obligations or obligations to 
support one's community or country (ibid, p.853). 
This is interesting because, even though some liberals have argued that they have not assumed 
that socialisation is non-existent or that one has these forms of obligations, the point of 
communitarianism is that there is not an adequate account or conceptualisation ofthat. 
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Fourthly, liberalism presupposes a defective conception of the self because it fails to recognize 
that the self is "embedded" in and partly constituted in community and values which are not a 
result of choices (ibid). 
Fifthly, liberalism has a wrong understanding of justice, because it understands justice as 
the"first virtue in social institutions". This presupposes that individuals hold conceptions of 
good prior to any community enabling them to choose any requirements for a just polity (ibid). 
The first four are the most powerful criticism presented by communitarians. The third and the 
fourth are the most important and relate directly to African philosophy. These are the views 
that are held by modem African philosophers as discussed in an earlier chapter. The difference, 
however, is that communitarianism responds to modem liberalism, whereas African philosophy 
invokes such propositions from an understanding of the person as steeped in community and 
culture that shapes his make-up. 
Buchanan (1989: 858) argues further that liberal individual rights provide valuable protections 
for the flourishing ofthe community. That means they are essential for development of a well 
ordered community. 
The problem with communitarians, therefore, is that they fail to recognise the value of 
individual rights for the community. The reason for this danger is that they have assumed that 
the only justification for the liberal individual rights rests exclusively upon the ideal of 
individual autonomy or individual well-being where participation is neglected as an important 
ingredient for human good (ibid, p.858). This means they have taken for granted that a 
commitment to liberal individual rights is inimical to any form of commitment to community 
participation. 
It can be argued that a commitment to the notion of liberal individual rights which neglects 
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the value of community and full participation in it will result in individual atomism that is 
rejected in communitarianism. On the other hand the commitment to community and full 
participation that excludes any notion ofliberal individual rights will result in an individual 
exposed to ostracism and other forms intrusions into his or her freedom by the community. 
Before we proceed with the further problems ofthe communitarian critique it would be useful 
to emphasise the three themes that are common in this tradition. The first is that community is 
an important human good (ibid). For Buchanan (ibid) this theme is uncontroversial because it 
is hard to deny the fact that a life lacking in any form of participation in community would be 
defective. The second is that participation in political community is a vital ingredient for good 
life of human beings. 
This view, according to Buchanan (ibid) is not uncontroversial but plausible and can be 
defended by appealing to such philosophers as Aristotle (ibid). The third theme is that 
participation in the highest political organisation in an inclusive political community such as 
the state, is an essential for the best life for all human beings (ibid). This is viewed as the most 
controversial ofthe three themes. Buchanan (ibid) argues that there are a diversity of the 
conditions that are favourable for human flourishing. Therefore, the assertion that the best life 
of human requires participation in this highest form of political organisation is an undefendable 
dogmatism and it depends on a highly particularistic theory ofthe objective good. The danger 
of this kind of thesis is the possibility of totalitarianism (ibid, p.860). This will result from the 
enforcement of one value or set of values in society where individuals are not protected by 
individual rights to pursue their own life plans without destructing the basis of their 
community. 
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Buchanan (ibid) suggests that the debate between communitarians and liberals might be seen 
as the disagreements on various ways of serving the value of the community but each 
highlighting different nature of risks rather between those who value community and those 
who do not. 
Re (ibid) is, therefore, asserting that the communitarians in arguing that modem liberals 
devalue community are misguided. 
These are serious criticisms that Buchanan (ibid) is presenting against communitarianism. It is 
important to note that he accepts the value of the community for the good life of human 
beings but raises concerns about rejection of liberal individual rights as problematic to 
commitment to community because it may lead to cultural oppression. In the light of this, 
argues Buchanan (ibid), a political liberal may be seen as a "cautious communitarian" . This 
view does not seek to reject the communitarian project as a whole. 
Buchanan (ibid) accepts the value of communitarian critique ifliberalism, he rejects the radical 
communitarian views evidenced in the third theme discussed above. The argument of the 
"cautious communitarian" is that in valuing community, one need not abandon the framework 
of individual rights but one should appreciate the role they can play in protecting communities 
under certain historical conditions (ibid,p.861). What are the historical conditions that 
Buchanan is envisaging? There are instances of change in societies, which involve a break 
from the norm and may offend the community's sensitivities (ibid). 
Therefore, individual rights may serve to facilitate rational change and formation of new 
communities by allowing individuals who are dissatisfied with the usual and current forms 
challenge and pioneer new alternatives. 
It is important to note that it is in the nature of communities to change or adapt to change 
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because the failure to do that will result in extinction in its isolationist tendencies. Buchanan 
(ibid, p.863) asserts that Mill's argument for liberty is significant for the flexibility of peaceful 
change provided by the framework of rights which outweighs the risks of excessive 
fragmentation and instability that concerns communitarians. This criticism did not seek to 
reject the value of the communitarian critique, but to raise blind spots that could lead to the 
eruption of the undesired and to raise the idea that valuing community should involve a 
framework of individual rights within that community. 
CULTURAL OPPRESSION 
The notion of communitarianism that excludes any framework of individual rights will result in 
what Kernohan (1998: 14) calls cultural oppression. This is the form of oppression that may 
be inflicted by an individual or a group to another group in a set of accumulative harms. 
Cultural oppression may occur through the transmission of certain beliefs about value and 
these values may be transmitted through language, images, stories, expectation and norms, and 
the role models presented by the community's cultural heritage (Kernohan, ibid). A person can 
only be subjected into this form of oppression through membership in a community. This is 
why the emphasis in prioritising the community over the individual person without any 
framework for individual protection may be problematic. Both communitarianism and African 
philosophy would fall into this trap, but Hegel seemed to escape this trap. 
Their prioritising of the community over the individual seems to believe in the intrinsic 
goodness of the community and the lack of faith in the individual ability for self-determination. 
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This is evidenced by the fact that communitarians and African philosophers believe that 
prioritisation of the individual over the community would result in social fragmentation. 
Though that may be true, they fail to look at the prioritisation of the community over the 
individual as having the possibility of the opposite extreme. They do not provide any 
framework for the protection of the individual from the intrusions of the community. The 
concept of cultural oppression is noteworthy because, as Kernohan (ibid) argues, it is a form 
of power. Citing Galbraith (ibid) he classifies the concept of power into three categories. 
These are condign power, compensatory and conditioned power. 
The concept of power associated with cultural oppression is conditioned power. Conditioned 
power operates through "persuasion, education, or the social commitment to what seems 
natural, proper, or right causing the individual to submit to the will of another or of others" 
(ibid, p.lS). 
The problem with this is that submission reflects the preferred course because the motivation 
of submission itself is not recognised. Because of its naturalness to the person subjected to it is 
immune to the critical reflection that will allow the individual to challenge it or shake it off 
(ibid). The individual self in communitarianism and African philosophy is susceptible to this 
kind of conditioning which seems desirable for these two perspectives. 
The problem arises in the failure to qualifY such notions as the constitution of the self and 
"embeddedness" in the community in both these philosophical traditions. The main objective 
of conditioned power is to crush independence of the conscience to produce a pathological 
commitment to community that is associated with the occult (ibid). 
The area that is most affected in this is the area of choice. It would seem that the choices of an 
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individual that is embedded in community do not go beyond the community scope of what is 
accepted and possible. This is celebrated in the philosophical traditions we are discussing as 
the evidence of the fact that this shows how things are supposed to be. 
Kernohan (ibid) argues that conditioned power does not just determine the outcome of 
person's choices "but also the process of deliberative choice itself is the site of human agency 
in the cognitive sense". The problem with conditioned power is summed up in Rousseau's 
assertion (in Kernohan, ibid) that "the most absolute authority is that which penetrates into a 
man's inmost being, and concerns itself no less with his will than with his actions". 
The point that is being made here is that the quality of the motivations that lead one into 
making choices and actions are skewed. 
This is significant in that it causes one to understand the value of Kant ian rationality as 
necessary for true freedom. This notion asserts that it is not the outcome by itself that decides 
the morality of the act, because one may pursue outcomes out of duty or a 'pathologically 
submissive self. The morality of the act must be decided by the quality of the motivation that 
inspires it (Taylor, 1985: 322). 
This is the notion that the communitarianism with its African philosophical perspective have 
rendered illegitimate. This is the question that we are going to pursue in the last section of this 
chapter. To illustrate the problem with cultural oppression. Cultural oppression makes 
inequality seem natural and makes groups of people to accept something less that their fair 
share. This is determined by the person's belief about value (ibid, p.2S). 
This problem can associated with African philosophy because while excluding any framework 
of individual rights, it provides an environment that is infested with onto logically justifiable 
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hierarchies. Individual person within such a culture (from which this thinking arises) will 
accept such justification as the natural order of things. This is the problem that Kigongo 
(1992: 61) sought to address in pointing out that such justifications result in political 
authoritarianism in modem political context and attribute unequal value between the young 
and old, denying the young any critical appraisal of the social system and depriving them of 
cognitive active participation(ibid, p.62). This is about denial of freedom from coercion, 
freedom of expression and participation. This problem is further pursued by Howard (1986) in 
the following section. 
AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS 
African philosophers in their discussions of African communitarianism, have sought to defend 
a notion of rights that is based on the cultural uniqueness of Africa (Howard, 1986: 16). The 
problem with this is that this undifferentiated communitarian society upon which this is based 
belonged to the pre-colonial and so it no longer exists (ibid). Therefore, this attempt to create 
a continuity with the past by invoking such notions of community can be seen as problematic 
in the sense that African cultures are changing and in the modern post -colonial context have 
begun to reflect the emergence of the new social classes with differential access to property 
and power (ibid, p.17). 
The defence of the communitarian values associated with the African past in the modern 
context would then reinforce such differential access to material resources and the imminent 
danger is that, as argued in Galbraith's concept of power (Kernohan, 1998:25), the people will 
accept such as the natural order of things owing to such commitment to norms that have 
originated in their cultural past. This is the first criticism of African communitarianism. 
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Howard's problem (1986: 17) is that African philosophers have rejected the notion of 
universal individual rights that are associated with modern liberalism on the basis of cultural 
relativity. Before going any further, it is necessary to note that the problem with Howard (ibid) 
is that in pursuing the critique of the African conception of rights, she does not offer any 
philosophical defence for the universality ofliberal individual rights she seeks to defend. 
Howard (ibid) suggests that the argument associated with African philosophers that different 
societies have their own particular conceptions of rights is based on the confusion of human 
rights with human dignity. She (ibid) argues that all societies have notions of human dignity 
that are based on the cultural views on the nature of human beings which in turn reflect the 
particular social organisations in each society. But these are different from rights as 
entitlements that allow the individual to make claims on or against the state. 
The versions of human dignity that are found in African philosophy are based on the idealised 
interpretations of the pre-colonial social structure. Invoking the pre-colonial model of African 
communtarianism neglects the social changes that have taken place in African societies since 
colonial times (ibid). This is the reality which the African socialists failed to grasp and as 
result they sought to build their societies upon a past long gone and consequently aborted 
perpetuating historical conditions that are now prevailing (ibid). This is another angle of attack 
on African communitarianism. 
Howard (ibid, p.18) argues that the concept of personhood that is presented by Menkiti 
(1984) and other versions of it found in other African philosophers, is not the basis for a 
concept of human rights. This concept, as shown in the previous chapter, tended to see 
personhood as the defining feature of Men but is an end product of the person's fulfilment of 
his or her prescribed roles (ibid) . Miers and Kopyoff (in Howard, ibid, p.19) argue that African 
societies have a different notion of freedom. 
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This is the notion that does not lie in the a withdrawal into a meaningless autonomy but in 
attachment to a kin group, and from that view they argue that even though slavery thrived in 
Afiican pre-colonial societies its antithesis was not freedom but belonging (ibid). This is based 
on the view that sums up African philosophy: existence-in-relation, as the desirable form of 
life. 
This discussion is essential in attempting to show that the concept of rights is different from 
the concept of human dignity. Howard (ibid) then goes on to argue that in the pre-colonial 
society, viewed as the perfect model and origin of African communitarianism, women, aliens 
and children were accorded different status and rank and consequently different rights and 
privileges than adult males. 
For African philosophical perspective of communitarianism to be a viable political philosophy 
in the modern context, it has to overcome these characteristics of the cultural values which 
form the basis of the content of their philosophy. Kigongo (1992: 61) agrees that there were 
coercive elements inherent in African communalism. At the same time there were also 
epistemological and political forms of authoritarianism. The epistemological form of 
authoritarianism was based on the monopoly that the elders had to knowledge and what they 
said had to be believed without question (Kaphagwani, in Kigongo, ibid). It is this 
epistemological authoritarianism that translated to political authoritarianism in modern times 
(ibid), and it resulted in the differential access of certain classes to material and power 
resources. 
Kigongo (ibid), having accepted this reality in African communitarianism, argues that 
individuality and social cohesion are two African cultural realities. He (ibid) argues "that they 
constitute a dichotomy, without any essential opposites". Individuality is defined as "the 
autonomous power of choice and decision of will as essential conditions for the exercise of 
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other freedoms" (ibid, p.60). And social cohesion is "a state of affairs whereby individual in 
the society constantly pursue certain fundamental virtues on the basis of enhancing a common 
or social good" (ibid). It is argued that these concepts are not antagonistic because if 
individualism is pursued responsibly or with a sense of duty, that is in a way that does not 
contradict with the common good (ibid). 
This is true , but it falls into the trap of conditioned power discussed in the previous section. 
Bidney (ibid) argues that this is clearly articulated in the assertion that a rational human being, 
a person directed by rational ideals conforming to rational principles, decides and acts in the 
context of values and standards of his society which are prior to his arrival in it (Bidney, ibid). 
That is difficult to understand because in the instances of social change which are discussed in 
the first section of this chapter, an individual person may be dissatisfied with the present order 
and seek to pioneer new alternatives that are unknown to his society and which may be 
offensive to its values. 
I think that the solution to this difficulty this necessitates appealing to values and standards 
which do not originate from the present society. In the absence of the framework of individual 
rights as separate from human dignity there will be no protection for such individuals. From 
the above discussion, it is clear that Afiican philosophy is deficient like communitarianism, in 
the area of protection of the individual against the intrusions of community and attribution of 
equal rights to all in society. In a society which has operated on the basis of respected 
hierarchies and social stratification, there is a perpetual need for some mediating agency 
between the individual and community in order to allow the individuals to be equally free. 
Having shown the weaknesses which African philosophical perspective of communitarianism 
has to overcome, it is necessary to present few defences by Afiican philosophers and make 
71 
suggestions. 
Gyekye (1998:328) argues that communitarianism is not antithetical to the doctrine of 
individual rights. He argues that communitarianism cannot disallow the exercise of the self-
determining individual who have the capacity to evaluate and re-evaluate the entire practice of 
the community. Gyekye (ibid) is the foremost African philosopher who has sought to consider 
the dangers of exaggerating the role of the community in the making and the determining of 
the individual and his actions. In response to the criticism made by Howard (1986), that 
African philosophers confuse the concept of human rights with their concept of human dignity, 
Gyekye (1998: 328) asserts that the respect for human dignity, which is the fundamental 
attribute of the human person which cannot be disregarded by the community generates regard 
for personal rights. 
What this means is, agreeing with Howard (1986) that there is a difference between human 
rights as claims and human dignity as mere acknowledgement of value, a notion of rights can 
be founded on the basis of human dignity. The concept of human dignity is anchored in theism. 
This is based on attribution of value upon al mankind by virtue of being created by God 
(Gyekye, 1998:328). This is evidenced in the maxims held in African communities that "all 
persons are children of God; no one is the child of the earth" (ibid). 
It is crucial to note that the presupposition in this thinking is the belief that there is something 
intrinsically valuable in God and this value, in the creation of humankind, is endowed upon all. 
The reason why this is important is that it is possible to derive a theory of rights from 
understandings of value in human beings more especially in societies that are steeped in such 
theistic beliefs. 
This is crucial because it relates to the Hegelian notion of mutual recognition and the popular 
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concept of"ubuntu" (humanness) which presupposes such beliefs as discussed above. 
Agrawal (1998: 153) states this view clearly when he argues that "in the human situation we 
are all for each other and paradigms of existing beings who have intrinsic worth". He (ibid) 
continues to say that without this kind of attitude towards each other we could not relate at 
the level of "rational communal activity" and the society of persons could not be realisable. 
This means that for the existence-in-relation propounded in African philosophy to be possible, 
there has to attribution ultimate worth between relating persons (ibid). Agrawal (ibid) 
concludes that it is the recognition of value of human life that is an essential, perhaps the 
foundational characteristic in the human community. The failure of African socialism was to 
recognise that the basis of the pre-colonial African communal structure was not economics of 
sharing but this was an outgrowth of these notions. Gyekye (ibid) continues to argue that even 
though a theory of rights is possible, it must to realised that communitarianism in general 
cannot be expected to give individual rights the priority. 
This is because communitarian theory in its nature assumes great concern for communal values 
and common good which is seen as of utmost importance for the healthy functioning of the 
individuaL 
Therefore, though rights have a role to play, communitarian theories will disallow the 
separation of rights from common values and will not give them priority. "It must be noted 
that in any scheme of value, ranking occurs or is resorted to when situations require that 
preferences for some values be made over other values" (Gyekye, ibid). This is supposed to 
mean that where necessary, communal values should take priority over the individual rights. 
This might be problematic because it betrays any notion of personal rights and individuals as 
ends in themselves. 
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Gyekye (in Coetzee, 2000a: 50) introduces the notion of equal moral standing of individuals-
as-units and individuals-in-relation in attempting a more coherent and advanced theory of 
individual rights in the communitarian context. This notion is called equiprimordiality. The 
individual-as-unit talks of individuals as being rational in the sense that they have an ability to 
make moral judgements. It is argued that the human individual has a mental feature in his or 
her biology which is independent of modification by the socio-cultural milieu (ibid). This 
means that an individual's reflexive abilities are given. Seen in this light, an individual has an 
ability to distance him/herself from inherited values and institutions (ibid). 
This is quite a step taken by Gyekye in modifying the moral authority accorded by other 
philosophers to community. On the other hand sociality, that is, individual-in-relation is also a 
natural feature which constitutes the context, cultural space for the actualisation of the human 
individual potential (ibid). The above discussion accepts the two realities of the human person, 
individuality and sociality and that these have equal moral standing. 
Gyekye (ibid) asserts that recognition of individual rights by communitarian theory is 
conceptually required. But he (ibid) does seem to be referring clearly to liberal individual 
rights. For Gyekye (Coetzee, p.51) "rights are a means of expressing an individual's talents, 
capacities and identity". 
This is the notion of rights as responsibility rather than corresponding obligations but they are 
based on moral responsiveness to other's needs . These rights should not be insisted on in the 
way that Howard (1986) argues. This is because the lack of sensitivity towards responsibility 
to others entitles community to take certain necessary steps in order to preserve the 
community but these may result in the overriding of individual rights (Gyekye, in Coetzee: 
2000: 52). This means that the community involves itself in the function of ranking of values, 
74 
and though recognising individual rights, they act in accordance with their order of importance 
and in pursuit of community's self-preservation may rightfully infringe on personal rights. 
Gyekye (ibid) in a way believes in the balance between common interest and individual goods 
and in the modem context it should be the function of the state to maintain the balance. 
But Gyekye's bias towards community appears in that in the event of direct conflict between 
the two, common interests take preference (ibid). This is in the nature of all communitarian 
theories owing to their priority of community over the individual and according to it such 
value has importance for function of human life. These are the most important responses that 
African communitarians put forward against the criticism posed towards them. The discussion 
so far has tried to accommodate the notion of individual rights, first by arguing that from the 
concept of human dignity a notion of personal rights can be generated and second, in the idea 
of the balance between individual good and common interest with priority given to the 
common good in the event of conflict. 
The acknowledgement of the need for respect of human rights is an important step. The 
important factor is however trying to describe which definition of rights is adopted, the liberal 
individual definition that was provided by Howard (1986) above or the notion of rights as 
responsibilities provided by Gyekye (in Coetzee, 2000: S 1). 
CONCLUSION: A SYNTHESIS 
Chikwudi Eze (in Coetzee, ibid, p.70) an Afucan philosopher argues that modernity calls for a 
rights-based state, this is essential in the light of the unchallengeable criticism Howard (1986) 
raised about gross inequalities in the modem context. 
Eze (ibid.) argues that this state should either uphold individual rights as overriding or find 
some reconciliation between individuals and groups as rights bearers. The second seems to be 
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the best option and this is what Gyekye has been attempting to do. It is the best option 
because ofthe lack of self-sufficiency of both individuality and individual rights and communal 
structure without such protections for individuals. The object of this thesis is reconciling 
different philosophical traditions. These are modem liberalism, Western communitarianism 
(mainstream) and African communitarianism with an emphasis on rationality and individualism 
and communitarianism. The similarity between western communitarianism and African 
philosophy would make possible a dialogue between them which each other to further 
contributions. 
And liberal political philosophy would be necessary for the justification of negative liberties in 
a way that would protect the individual while preserving the community. 
The discussion presented in the preceding chapters and in this chapter indicates that each of 
these philosophical traditions has inadequacies, and so there has to be some reconciliation in 
ways that have already been suggested during the discussion. Hegel (in Bellamy, 2000) offers 
a bedrock of what any attempt to reconcile these traditions should entail. 
According to Bellamy (2000: 04) Hegelian philosophy disputes the liberal argument of 
inherent incompatibility between the individual and the community. Hegel's project is to 
attempt to explain human freedom and individuality (ibid). The Kantian agent is an 
autonomous chooser of ends and he can distance himself from his or her natural inclinations. 
This forms the foundations of the liberal individuals. This theory views society as a contract 
between individuals for the realisation of goals that were self-determined antecedently (ibid, 
p.5). Hegel contrasts this view and he attempts to show the process by which an "individual's 
will is realised in particular objects and mediated by certain universal norms of behaviour 
which are social in origin" (ibid). For Hegel, possession of such norms of behaviour constitute 
individual identity, providing human actions in the context of community with meaning and 
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continuity (ibid). This means the individual makes sense of him or herself, of what he or she 
does in the context ofthe society. 
The particular can only make sense of itself in the context of the universal. 
Hegel sought to find the resolution for the dilemma between the particular and the universal, 
that is, between individuality and community which has been the main theme of this thesis. 
This is achieved through a synthesis between the two (ibid, p.6). The community has a set of 
cultural norms, values and traditions which are inherent to the collective practices of its 
members and these are rooted and develop in the history of the community. Though the 
individual shares many concepts together with the others within the community, this does 
entail his or her complete identity. For Bellamy (ibid, p.7) the relation of the community to the 
individual can be likened to the way rules of language relate to speech. Though vocabulary 
and grammar do not determine what one thinks or say, they do structure it. 
This point is inevitable for understanding the synthesis between individuality and sociality or 
community. What Hegel is arguing is that the will, wants, desires and autonomous actions of 
individual agents develop within the context of society rather than antecedent to it (ibid, p.8). 
Hegel's philosophy is important in showing the formative process of the individual agent. 
Bellamy (ibid) argues that Hegel 
proposed an institutional framework which would provide an 
arena for individuals to voice criticism of their social bonds 
and hence develop them as human needs change, without 
returning to a putative asocial state of nature of the war of all 
against all. 
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This means that the individual is embedded within the community as it has been argued by 
western and African communitarians but this does it does not mean that it ceases to exist. 
Hegel argues (in Bellamy, ibid) that the individual "consciousness emanates from the 
individual himself and is not instilled into him by others: the individual exists within the 
substance". This is noteworthy because if the individual is seen in this light, there would be a 
need for negative liberties in order to protect the forceful communal intrusions or cultural 
oppression which would seek to deform such consciousness. 
The role of the community would also be seen as important in order to provide the context not 
just for the fulfilment of individual desires autonomously chosen but for their development. 
The community seen as the arena where individuals can reflect and reason about their social 
bonds as shown in Hegel ' s dialectic, would lead to each in community valuing each other 
(ibid) . This is crucial as it has been argued by Agrawal (1998: 153) that it is the recognition of 
value and ultimate worth of persons as the foundational feature of human life that the social 
bonds can be realisable. Therefore, rights based on the idea of mutual recognition would not 
be seen as destructive to the common good. 
This should be the basis of reconciliation between Western and African philosophy in the 
issues of individuality, communitarianism and rationality, that individuality is reconcilable with 
community drawing arguments from all three for such assertions, and that Kantian rationality 
basing the liberal character if moderated can co-exist with Hegelian rationality, concerned with 
processual development of such rationality, which informs communitarianism. In this, African 
philosophy is very important in enlivening the communitarian debate by returning the 
metaphysical debates found in Hegel, assertions which have been avoided by western 
communitarians, as argued by Bellamy (2000:3), for fear of totalitarianism. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis liberal individualism, communitarianism and African philosophy have been 
explicated in order to allow us to understand the differing origins of each of these 
philosophical traditions. In the last chapter the critical evaluation of the communitarian critique 
of liberalism and African communitarianism is presented. This allowed us to establish the 
possibility of reconciling themes flowing out of these with liberal individualism in an attempt to 
create a balanced society. The main themes that emerged from the beginning to the end of this 
thesis are those of individuality and community. The debate between these views in social and 
political theory is an old one. But it has been drawn to relevance in the contemporary era by 
the need for a balance between the community and the indiviual in the wake of an era of 
human rights. There has been a need to establish the line between the private sphere, the 
sphere of the individual and the public sphere, the sphere of society. The main question has 
been to what extent can individual autonomy be limited by communal obligation? It is 
important to note that this debate has existed in the mainstream political philosophy from the 
Western perspectives. African philosophical views have been relegated to the realm of 
anthropology. 
In this thesis an effort has been taken to craft African philosophy into this debate and 
acknowledge what modern African communitarians have said. This has opened the dialogue 
and broadened the scope of the debate. It also served to highlight the significance of such 
concepts as culture, traditions, language and contextual rationality in the creation the 
commonality, which is important for community. African perspectives' emphasis on these has 
been the reason for relegation to the realms of anthropology, but it is noteworthy that these are 
also the strengths of African perspectives in social and political theoretical debates as has been 
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shown in this thesis. 
This is the case, particularly in the possibility opened in the fourth chapter, of providing an 
alternative foundation for the theory of rights on the basis of human dignity. 
Modem African philosophers, African communitarians in particular, embark on a shift from 
mere assertions of folk traditional thought to the critical examination of these to extract issues 
that are relevant for contemporary philosophy. This necessitates the analytical dimension, self-
reflection and argumentative justification as shown in the third chapter. In that way African 
philosophy has been able to engage other philosophical traditions. In contemporary South 
Africa and post-colonial Africa, there is a need to embark on the kind of research which 
establishes the bases for a balanced state, one which upholds the individual without destroying 
the framework for the community and the culture which makes society cohere. In the last 
chapter it has been established that though community is essential, individual rights are 
necessary for the protection of the individual against the negative intrusions of the community. 
And they are necessary to accommodate and facilitate social change which is inevitable for 
continuous survival of the community (Buchanan, 1989: 863). Establishing the basis for the 
above-mentioned facts is a major achievement of this thesis. 
Reconciling different philosophical traditions is a significant step considering the political 
history of Africa. Didier Khaphagwani (in Kigongo, 1992: 61) has argued that from Africa's 
concept of personhood, as presented by Menkiti, 1984), results epistemological 
authoritarianism, which exalts the elderly as the only section of the community that has access 
to knowledge and wisdom having reaching the full personhood. This leads to political 
authoritarianism in the modem political context and the exclusion of the young and women in 
political institutions. 
80 
In light of this, this thesis opened African philosophy to the challenge of its unbalanced and 
cultural rooted notion of personhood. This has contributed to the achievement of what Taylor 
(in O'Neill, 1999: 20) calls the 'fusion of horizons' . This means the sharing of [perspectives in 
an effort to understand the 'other culture' .(ibid). This is crucial because the understanding of 
something new or different, the exposure to the' other' perspective, is self-transformative to 
the extent that it involves the broadening of our horizons (ibid). This is what we have 
attempted in this study, because it opens a dialogue between philosophical traditions and in a 
sense establishing a symbiosis between them. 
The idea of the reconciliation between these philosophical traditions contributes to the 
understanding of rights of minorities within communities which is another pertinent issue for 
contemporary politics. This is one fact that made Hegel important as a bedrock upon which 
synthesis could be based. In Hegel's dialectic, the community is seen as the arena where 
individuals can reflect and reason about their social bonds and this leads to each in community 
valuing each other (Bellamy, 2000: 8). This is important in the context of multi-ethnic and 
multicultural societies in post-colonial African states. Van der Merwe (1998: 7) argues that 
multiculturalism "demands a philosophical reflection from within criss-crossing of and 
breaches between various particular histories, traditions and modes of thinking intermingled in 
the multicultural context of present-day societies". The synthesis between these philosophical 
traditions is a step towards realising the above in the modem political context. 
The invoking of Hegelian thinking as a bedrock for the kind of a synthesis that has been 
undertaken in this thesis is not assuming neutrality, because there is no neutral ground, no 
"view from nowhere"(Van der Merwe, 1998: 8). 
It is important to note that every philosophical perspective has its own history and tradition. 
Van der Merwe (ibid) argues that this realisation forces one to enter into dialogue with the 
81 
other perspectives, a synthesis which allows each perspective to complement another. 
Rationality is at the centre of this undertaking. The notion of rationality that bases a 
philosophical perspective is essential. The form of rationality that assumes universality, which 
is the feature of Western philosophy, is potentially problematic for the valuing of other cultures 
or perspectives. According to O'Neill (1999:22) human rationality must be thought of as being 
embedded within particular forms oflife. This is historical bound and communally embedded 
rationality that is associated with the communitarian critique ofliberalism and Mrican 
philosophy. These are the essential foundations for the respect of each other, at the same time, 
this mutual recognition leads to the 'fusion of horizons'. 
Hegelian philosophy is the closest to the ideal of reconciliation of perspectives which promote 
individuality and those that uphold community. Hegel (in Bellamy, 2000) sought to find the 
resolution to the age-old dilemma between the universal and the particular, that is, between the 
individuality and community, the object of this thesis, and this is achieved through the 
synthesis ofthe Western and African philosophy at the level individualism, rationality and 
communitarianism. 
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